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IlI1ltrmhu eti 0 II1l 
In 1989, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe dramatically unravelled 
the Cold War division of Europe through a decisive rejection of the Soviet-
controlled regimes which had held power for the previous forty years. This 
rejection of their post-World War 11 political late was paralleled with a 
deeply-felt yearning to return to the European family of nations. In particu-
lar, they sought to obtain the security, prosperity and freedom that the 
countries of Western Europe had enjoyed whilst they had suffered the 
humiliation and the political and economic degradations of Soviet imperial 
rule. In political shorthand, this was translated into the desire to join, or 
more accurately to re-join, the West. 
This desire to join the West has been given its most concrete expression 
by the demand of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to acquire 
full membership ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU). With justification, these countries have viewed 
NATO and the EU as the critical structural foundations of the political 
stability and the economic prosperity which has so marked the progress of 
Western Europe after the devastation of World War 11. The countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe have not perceived membership of NATO and 
the EU as merely of symbolic value. It is seen as an essential prerequisite 
for the success of their efforts to transform themselves from their com-
munist past. 
NATO and the EU have made significant moves towards meeting the 
aspirations of the newly liberated countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
NA TO has offered various mechanisms and institutional fora, most notably 
the Partnership for Peace programme (PFP), for increased cooperation 
between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries. The EU has 
similarly reached trade agreements with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and offered greater collaboration for the governments of 
those countries to participate in EU policy making processes. However, on 
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the critical question of offering full membership of NATO or the EU for 
the aspirant countries from the East, there has been considerably more 
reticence. [n the early part of 1997, neither of these bodies, despite their 
formal commitment to take on new members, have yet explicitly identified 
individual candidates as candidates for full membership. 
However, this relicence is almost cenainly going to change at the 
NA TO summit in Madrid in July 1997. At the December [996 NA TO 
ministerial meeting in Brussels, it was agreed that in Madrid the first new 
candidates from Central and Eastern Europe, most probably Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, would be formally invited to initiate negotia-
tions for membership of NATO. Implicitly, it is clearly the intention ofthe 
16 NATO governments that the timing of the incorporation of these 
members into NA TO should coincide with the 50th anniversary of the 
organisation in 1999. 
[fthe planned schedule is maintained, the Madrid Summit in July 1997 
will mark a major milestone in the evolution of a new security architecture 
in Europe which will seek to consolidate the unification of the continent 
and prevent the emergence of a "security vacuum" in Central and Eastern 
Europe. However, it is important to stress that this is only one, even if 
qualitatively more significant, step in the ongoing evolution and adaptation 
of the major European institutions. NATO enlargement to incorporate 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic still leaves many other states in 
Central and Eastern Europe outside of NATO's gates. Their security 
concerns, and in panicular the considerable reservations and outright 
hostility of Russia to NA TO enlargement, will need to be addressed. NATO 
enlargement is also coinciding with a radical restructuring and internal 
reform ofNA TO which seeks to make the organisation more flexible and 
capable to meet the more diffuse and complex security challenges of the 
post-Cold War period. In addition, it is inevitable that the first steps to-
wards NATO enlargement will place pressure on the EU to accelerate its 
process of expansion eastward and to ensure that its internal reforms 
facilitate the accession of new members. 
The process of eastward enlargement is, therefore, going to continue to 
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present major challenges and difficult decisions. For the next decade, the 
management of this process of eastward enlargement will exercise the 
diplomatic acumen and ingenuity of the leaders and oHicials of the govern-
ments ofUle Atlantic Alliance and the EU. 
Objectives of this study 
This study will not offer predictions for the future evolution of eastward 
enlargement. Nor will the study directly address the issue of whether 
eastward enlargement, particularly by NATO, is a desirable or undesirable 
strategic objective. Rather, this study analyses the progress made since 
1989 in promoting the process of eastward enlargement and seeks to 
provide the conceptual tools for understanding the dynamics, most notably 
the national interests Mthe major states within NATO and EU, which both 
propel and impede this process. By so doing, it is hoped that the reader will 
have a better context for understanding the many challenges that face, and 
will continue to face, the United States and the major European states in the 
practical implementation of eastward enlargement. 
The study has three main sections: 
Chapter I provides an overview of the post-Cold War security environ-
ment in Europe. In particular, it analyses the impact of the Yugoslav 
conflict on European security and how this conflict highlighted the need 
for major internal reforms of the principal European security institutions 
and the implications this has had for progress towards eastward enlarge-
ment. 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed assessment of the moves made by NATO, 
the EU, and the Western European Union (WEU) towards eastward en-
largement and the difficulties and obstacles they have faced in promoting 
their objectives to the East. Discussion of the WEU is included in this 
section since, although formally independent of the EU and NATO, it acts 
as the "defence arm" of the EU and is closely associated with NATO. 
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Chapter 3 outlines the positions adopted by the countries deciding upon, 
and being affected by, the process of eastward enlargement. First, this 
involves an assessment of the positions taken by the major NATO and EU 
countries - Germany, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. 
Second, Russia's stance towards NATO enlargement is assessed. Third, 
the position of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are 
potential NATO and EU candidate members, is described. 
The conclusions of the study will focus on the most immediate chal-
lenges facing NATO and the EU in the light of the probable decision in July 
1997 to invite the tirst new members from Central and Eastern Europe to 
join NATO. 
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Chapter 1: European security after the 
Cold War 
The euphoria of the events of 1989, when Eastern Europe liberated itself 
from the Soviet and communist yoke, was replaced by increasing gloom 
and despondency as the conilict in the former Yugoslavia, a country 
undeniably in the heart of Europe, imploded into bitter and violent fighting 
in 1992 and 1993. The impact of the Yugoslav conflict on the issue of 
eastward enlargement has been twofold. First, it demonstrated the urgency 
and need for NA TO and the EU to continue to play a role in promoting 
stability within the European continent. But, second, it also showed that 
neither the institutions nor the policy-making structures of NATO and the 
EU were adequately con figured to deal with the type of post-Cold war 
security challenges that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia represented. 
As a result, both institutions became more acutely aware of the urgency of 
radical internal reforms to adapt to the new challenges of the post-Cold 
war security environment. To the extent that the requirement of internal 
reform has been considered as a prerequisite for any adoption of new 
members from the East, this has had the effect of delaying the process of 
eastward enlargement. 
This chapter examines the structural changes and developments in the 
European security environment in the aftermath of the Cold War, which 
were first most clearly exposed by the war in the former Yugoslavia. The 
implications this has had on eastward enlargement will then be assessed. 
From optimism to uncertainty. the impact of the Yugoslav 
conflict 
In the immediate aftermath of the Velvet Revolution, the member states of 
NA TO and the EU tended politely to ignore the requests for membership 
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from Central and Eastern European countries. This was principally due to 
an innate conservatism which cautioned against any precipitate reforms to 
institutions which had so successfully challenged and ultimately defeated 
the communist threat. However, there was also a further perceived justifi-
cation for deflecting these demands. This was based on the belief that, in 
the post-Cold War period, the process of political and economic transfor-
mation in Central and Eastern Europe would primarily be self-generating. In 
this analysis, institutions were only of secondary importance to the inherent 
dynamic of political democratisation and economic liberalisation which the 
end of the ideological struggle of the Cold War had unleashed. 
Francis Fukuyama, in his essay on the End DJ HiS/DIY, provided the 
philosophical defence for this liberal optimism, arguing that the end of the 
Cold War had definitively confirmed that there could be no alternative to 
capitalism and democracy as the models for economic and political organi-
sation.' Implicit in this approach was the reassuring expectation that the 
European continent had been radically transformed by the demise of 
Marxism-Leninism and the collapse of the Soviet Union. One could hope 
therefore that, at least in the near to medium future, there would be no 
significant challenges to the stability and security of Central and Eastern 
Europe. In this putatively more benign environment, it followed that there 
was no need hastily to expand NA TO and the EU, with all the associated 
sensitive strategic, political and economic reforms that would require. 
Instead, there could be a relatively long breathing space as the aspirant 
countries engaged with those internal reforms which would make them 
acceptable candidates for membership. 
However, this belief in an inexorable process ofIiberal expansion did 
not last for long. Fukuyama's analysis was always treated Illore sceptically 
in Europe than in the United States. Europeans have a keener sense of the 
turbulent, conflictual and violent nature of the history of their continent 
than Americans who, from time to time, succumb to the vision of a 
conflict-free federation of liberal democracies. 
Nevertheless, the European nations were just as shocked and unpre-
pared as the United States for the extreme violence of the successive wars 
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of succession in the former Yugoslavia. At first, the Western European 
states, emboldened by the increased level of political integration sanctioned 
by the Maastricht Treaty, saw the Yugoslav conflict as the ideal opportu-
nity for the European Union to exert its newly consolidated independent 
powers. As Jacques Poos, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister heading the 
EU troika that tried to stop the war in Yugoslavia, exclaimed in 1991, this 
was to be "the hour of Europe".' The humiliating exposure of the weakness 
and the ineffectual vacillations of the EU during the four year civil war in 
the former Yugoslavia until the Day ton Accords in November 1995 have 
been described in detail elsewhere.' But, two general conclusions can be 
drawn from the Yugoslav conflict which have a direct impact on the issue 
ofNA TO and EU enlargement. 
First, the developments in Yugoslavia conclusively demonstrated that 
the end ofthe Cold War had not resolved all the mUltiple underlying 
sources of conflict within Europe. Indeed, as many commentators were 
quick to note, the East-West division in Europe had itself been a significant 
stabilising factor which had smothered or frozen many ethnic, religious and 
political disputes. In the absence of this overarching Cold War structure, 
these disputes could once again become the source of conflict both be-
tween states and, even more insidiously, within states. 
Samuel Huntington, in his provocative article on the Clash a/Civilisa-
tions, provided a number of important insights into this new reality by 
suggesting that differences of culture could become significant sources of 
conflict in the absence of a bipolar international order.' In this respect, 
Huntington noted that the Yugoslav wars were being waged on the historic 
faultlines between the Islamic world, Eastern orthodoxy and Western 
catholicism. Although Huntington has been rightly criticised for placing too 
much emphasis on these "cultural" factors for the causes of the conflict -
there were multiple other causes for the bloody fragmentation of Yugosla-
via - the basic insight'is significant. In Central and Eastern Europe, the 
countries with a predominantly orthodox background, such as Romania, 
Bulgaria, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, have not progressed as fast in their 
political and economic transition as the countries with a historically more 
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Western orientation, whether Catholic or Protestant, such as the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary and the Baltic countries. 
Although these "cultural" elements should not be viewed in too deter-
ministic a fashion, Huntington's argument, taken in parallel with the events 
in the former Yugoslavia, is a warning against presupposing that stability 
can be presumed in Central and Eastern Europe. Not very far from the 
surface, there are significant disputes over borders, minority rights, and 
other issues which could, if not adequately addressed, escalate into violent 
conflict. Also, all the countries in the region are struggling with the consid-
erable social dislocations caused by the painful process of economic 
reform. As a general pattern, the more eastward one looks the more 
politically destabilising this process is emerging, with the social, political 
and economic flux in Ukraine and Russia being the most extreme manifes-
tations. As the Yugoslav conflict demonstrated, if a conflict does escalate, 
other European states will be hard pressed to contain the ensuing instabil-
ity, let alone be capable of resolving the internal causes of the violent 
upheaval. 
This leads to the second major consequence of the Yugoslav war. Just 
as the developing conflict undermined the sense of complacency at Eu-
rope's intrinsic stability, so the belief in the internal strength and cohesion 
of the principal Western European institutions - NATO and the EU - was 
radically weakened. In this first major post-Cold War security challenge, 
both these institutions revealed significant deficiencies and a perceptible 
fragility which, at the very least, suggested the need for substantive internal 
reforms. The first casualty was the EU's ambitious proclamation at 
Maastricht in 1991 of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 
Yugoslav war demonstrated, in graphic detail, how diverse and uncommOIl 
were the national interests of the EU member states over a crisis which had 
a direct and immediate impact on the security of the European Union as a 
whole. The dispute between Germany, and Britain and France, over the 
question of recognition ofCroatia and Bosnia Herzegovina was sympto-
matic of the inherent difficulties offorging a unified EU security policy in 
areas where there were significantly diverging national interests at hand. 
12 
The cracks in the unified stance of the EU was to be followed by an 
even more intense internal dispute within NATO. This was again due to 
fundamentally diverging national perceptions of the nature of the conflict, 
and the corresponding policy prescriptions to be pursued. The main rift 
was primarily between the United States and the European countries 
(principally Britain and France as the major EU troop contributors to the 
UN peacekeeping operations), which in turn threatened to undermine the 
transatlantic linchpin of the Atlantic Alliance. Whilst the United States 
focused on Serbia as the clear aggressor and recommended anti-Serb 
peace-enforcement measures, principally through NATO air strikes, the 
European allies counselled a more neutral stance which would protect the 
UN-sponsored peacekeeping operation and would promote a diplomatic 
settlement between the warring parties. Although the Day ton accords in 
late 1995 succeeded in forging a mutually acceptable compromise, which 
in turn healed the ruptures and reinvigorated NATO, the crises of the 
previous three years had exposed the fragilities of the Atlantic Alliance. As 
in the EU, the Yugoslav conflict demonstrated how difficult it would be to 
forge a common US-European policy towards post-Cold War security 
problems where there exist significant divergences of national interest. 
Implications of the Yugoslav conflict for eastward 
enlargement 
These two overarching consequences of the Yugoslav conflict have had a 
direct impact on the quest of the Central and Eastern European countries 
for membership ofNA TO and the EU. On the one hand, tile escalation of 
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the extreme violence which 
ensued, has confirmed the need for a greater urgency to expand the 
structures of NATO and the EU eastward so as to underpin the stability 
and security of the European continent. The evidence that many regions of 
the post-Cold War political settlement, most notably in Russia and the 
European parts of the former Soviet Union, suffer from similar symptoms 
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to those in the former Yugoslavia has only intensified the sense of urgency. 
At least in part, it is in response to this strategic chalIenge that both NATO 
and the EU have promised that enlargement wiII definitely take place. 
However, the slowness and delays of both NATO and the EU in fulfilI-
ing promises to adopt new members reflects the other legacies of the 
Yugoslav conflict. Almost a decade after the Velvet Revolution, the EU has 
still not provided a timetable or specified the initial candidates for member-
ship and the earliest probable date that new members wiII be formally 
welcomed into NATO is in 1999. The core problem is that, to accept new 
members of NATO or the EU requires the existing members to take on 
new responsibilities, most critically the responsibility to provide defence 
and security guarantees. Yet, as the Yugoslav crisis revealed, adopting new 
responsibilities without developing the institutional mechanisms for ensur-
ing the smooth implementation of these obligations is the surest way to 
undermine the cohesion and integrity of the institutions themselves. In this 
sense, the Yugoslav crisis has engendered a considerable caution amongst 
the existing member states ofNA TO and the European Union, since it 
revealed how divergent their national interests can be and how difficult it is 
to subsume these ditferences to promote joint, multilateral action. 
Underlying the cautious response to the Central and Eastern European 
requests is, therefore, a fear that the cost of expanding NA TO and the EU 
eastward might ultimately be the undennining of the cohesion and integrity 
of the institutions themselves. As a result, the existing members of NATO 
and the EU have agreed that, as an essential pre-condition for the adoption 
of new members, substantive and wide-ranging internal reforms must be 
implemented. Also, given these concerns over institutional integrity, it is 
argued that, on any realistic scenario, new members can only be taken on 
gradually and on a case-by-case basis. But, however cogent this logic 
might be for preserving institutional integrity, it is far less clear that such a 
conditional and incremental process of enlargement will satisfy the security 
and defence needs of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Particu-
larly for those countries excluded from the first wave of new members, 
there is a real danger that their sense of insecurity will increase rather than 
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be diminished by the process of eastward enlargement. 
This, at heart, is the dilemma facing the United States and the Western 
European countries as they contemplate the enlargement of NATO and the 
EU. The external security situation sanctions the logic of enlargement, 
thereby overcoming the artificial Cold War East-West division and provid-
ing the institutional support for the stabilisation of East and Central Europe. 
However, the internal logic of institutional consolidation counsels a policy 
of caution and, at best, gradual incremental change. Without such a 
cautious and gradual approach, the danger is that the necessary internal 
reforms will not be implemented which can ensure tllUt, in the process of 
taking on new responsibilities towards East and Central Europe, the cohe-
sion and integrity ofNA TO and the EU are not fatally undermined. 
Adapting to the end of the Cold War· NATO and the EU 
In the shifting and radically transformed strategic environment of the post-
Cold War era, the need to identify the core underlying, purpose and value 
of the Atlantic Alliance and the European project has been widely dis-
cussed. One issue on which there is a widespread consensus is that the 
essential purpose and rationale for the existence of NA TO and the EU was 
something more than the defence of Western values against the threat of 
Soviet expansionism, .however importnat and nearly all-consuming that 
mission was. More fundamentally, these institutions were rooted in an 
overarching strategy of European and transatlantic institutional integration 
which sought to provide a critical dynamic to supplant the national diver-
gences which had come so close to destroying European civilisation from 
1914 to 1945. At a fundamental level, NATO and the EU Were created to 
ensure that there should be no recurrence of a major European war. The 
success of these institutional arrangements in achieving this goal during the 
Cold War explains why such institutions are perceived to be important to 
European security thinking. At the bedrock of the transatlantic and Euro-
pean integrated structures, there lies a firm conviction that stabilising 
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institutions are essential for preserving and sustaining European stability. 
It was for this reason that the immediate response to the end of the 
Cold War, both in Washington and the European capitals, was that NATO 
and the EU continued to have a vital role to play in the post-Cold War era. 
It was commonly felt that these institutions had a purpose and raison d'etre 
which transcended the Cold War and which was based upon a common 
and shared community of values. Despite the withdrawal of Russia from 
Eastern Europe, there was a general consensus that the engagement of the 
United States, through the Atlantic Alliance, remained critical to European 
security. Within th,e European Union, there was also a widespread convic-
tion that the process of integration, of "deepening the union", remained a 
vital European interest, not least for ensuring that a reunified Germany 
stayed firmly embedded within the structures and institutions of the 
European Union. And, the inevitable logic of NATO's and the EU's new 
post-Cold War purpose was that the stabilising benefits of integration 
should not indefinitely be restricted to the countries of Western Europe but 
gradually draw in those countries which had been liberated from Soviet 
imperial control. 
The end of the Cold War, therefore, did not dampen, but rather consid-
erably increased, the enthusiasm for the development and extension of the 
integrative processes of NA TO and the EU. However, there was a far 
slower realisation of how the end of the Cold War had also materially 
affected the dynamic of integration. There was only a gradual awareness 
that the absence of a clear external enemy did present a significant obstacle 
to the drive for military and political integration and had introduced, in 
many important areas, powerful new disintegrative processes. 
This was most clearly the case with NATO where the constant Soviet 
threat provided the impetus for military integration for collective defence 
purposes. But, albeit in a more subtle manner, the Cold War also provided a 
strategic framework in which the construction of a European identity made 
sense to the peoples and nations of Western Europe. The threat of a 
Soviet-imposed Eastern European identity acted as a significant catalyst for 
the construction of a contrasting Western European identity, which in turn 
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legitimated the sublimating of national sovereignties required for the con-
struction of such an identity. In the aftermath of the Cold War, as the 
fraught process of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty revealed, the 
peoples of the EU states have shown themselves to be far more sceptical 
of the benefits of integration and more wary that these benefits do not 
outweigh the consequent loss of national sovereign powers. 
This process of disintegration is nowhere more clearly pronounced than 
in the field of security and defence policy. As the clear and unambiguous 
Soviet threat has dissolved, the attempt to define new potential threats, or 
"risks" as NATO defines them, has been an acute source of division.' It 
has been increasingly the case that the priority given to these potential 
threats has been dependent on the perceived national interests of the 
members states of the EU and NATO. Within the EU a clear division has 
emerged between those states which accord priority to the perceived 
threats from the South and those which focus principally on the East. The 
southern Mediterranean countries, such as Spain, Italy and France have 
shown greatest concern over the threat of Islamic extremism and instability 
originating from North Africa and the Arab world. In contrast, Germany 
and the Scandinavian countries have directed most of their energies to the 
quest of stabilising Central and Eastern Europe. Greece's Balkan orientation 
and Britain's semi-detachment on the periphery of the European continent 
have only added to the fragmentation of a common sense of purpose in EU 
foreign and security policy. 
NATO has also suffered from a similar process of internal disorienta-
tion. The most significant aspect of this has been the continuing uncer-
tainty over the United States' strategic engagement in Europe. The Clinton 
administration has been torn over whether to re-direct attention to domestic 
issues, whether to focus US foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific 
region, and the extent to which US engagement in Europe is still critical in 
the post-Cold War era.' For their part, the European allies have been divided 
over how far they should remain dependent on the United States within the 
NA TO framework and the degree to which they should be developing a 
European capability based on the security and defence pillar of the Euro-
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pean Union and the Western European Union. Superimposed on these 
problems has been the evidence, most clearly visible during the Yugoslav 
conflict, of the diverging and the fluid nature of national interests in defin-
ing security and defence policies. The Day ton Accords in November 1995 
ensured that these divergences did not escalate out of control and, to an 
extent, a new transatlantic consensus was attained, but it would be prema-
ture to assume that all the varying conflicts of interest have been defini-
tively resolved. 
Thus, the larger picture that emerges from the end orn,e Cold War is that, 
whilst the value ofNA TO and EU integration and expansion have retained 
their saliency, the reality is of increasing divergencies of perceived national 
interest and a far greater difficulty at arriving at common policies which can 
be the basis for joint multilateral action. Attempts to resolve this dilemma have 
only tended to add to the confusion and to undennine furti,er the lack of 
common purpose. Although all member states agree that institutional refonn 
of the EU and NATO are critical if NATO and the EU are to be revitalised, the 
nature and content of these reforms are bitterly contested. This is most 
graphically seen in the EU where the debate since the Maastricht Treaty has 
focused almost entirely on how to further the project of European integration 
with, at the same time, managing increasing divergencies of national interest. 
At one extreme, Great Britain radically questions the logic of furti,er integra-
tion when national divergences are inevitably becoming more fluid. At the 
other extreme, Germany promotes the need for further integration precisely to 
overcome the re-nationalisation of European interests and values. The degree 
to which this internal institutional debate has become almost the sole obsession 
of the EU is reflected in the 1996-97 inter-governmental conference (IGC) 
directing the greater part of its energies to the issue of institutional refimn. 
NATO has not suffered so publicly from such displays of intemal wran-
gling, but the quest for institutional reform has been almost as intense and 
divisive. Like the EU, NATO has sought to preserve and extend the benefits of 
integration whilst accommodating the changed strategic environment and the 
greater fluidity of national interests. In particular, it has tried to institutionalise 
the reality of ad hoc alliances which have been the basis of the actions taken in 
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the Gulf War and the Yugoslav conflict. This has been developed through the 
concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) which seeks to provide the 
assets of the NA TO integmted structure but which can be utilised by varying 
coalitions of NATO members, including non-NA TO members within tile 
Partnership for Peace programme.' 
For a period, discussions over the CJTF concept were blocked by a 
dispute between France, which sought to ensure that NATO assets could be 
used by a European coalition under WEU command and control, and tile 
United States which was detennined to maintain a veto over the use of such 
assets if the Europeans were to decide upon a collective action not involving 
US troops. After much diplomatic wrangling, a compromise was reached. 
However, new Fmnco-American disagreements re-appeared in late 1996 over 
NATO plans to reform and slim down its command structure with Fmnce 
demanding that a European should have control of Command South which the 
United States has refused to countenance. However, it is expected that a 
compromise on this issue will be reached prior to the July 1997 NATO 
Summit, so that an agreed and comprehensive reform package can be an-
nounced at the meeting. 
Both the EU and NATO, therefore, have been engaged in a divisive and 
introspective debate over the requirements of institutional refonn for the post-
Cold War period. More than anything else, this has been tile reason why the 
critical decisions over NA TO and EU enlargement to Central and Eastern 
Europe have tended to be subordinated to these internal developments. The 
European Union has specifically stated that EU enlargement eastward cannot 
be addressed until the 1996-97 inter-governmental conference has introduced 
the promised institutional reforms. NATO has certainly been more proactive 
over the enlargement question but the resolution of its internal reforms has 
also tended to take priority over making finn decisions to accept new mem-
bers from the East. At the July 1997 NATO Surmnit, it is only because it is 
intended that the plans for internal reforms ofNA TO will be confirmed that 
this will open the path for the accession of new members from Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
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Enlargement to lEast and Central lEurope . the strategic 
context 
The Madrid NA TO Summit highlights that decisions over enlargement 
cannot be postpolled indefinitely. At stake is the simple issue oJ'credibility. 
At some point. the failure to address, in a concrete manner, the promises 
made to the countries of East and Central Europe is bound to affect the 
credibility ofNA TO and the EU and their constituent member states. 
Leaders such as President Clinton and Chancellor Helmut Kohl have 
expended considerable political capital in reassuring the Central and Eastern 
European countries that the question of enlargement is not one of "whether 
but when and how".' Failure to live up to these promises would result in a 
considerable loss of personal prestige as well as provoking an uproar in the 
capitals of East and Central Europe. It should also be remembered that, 
particularly in the United States and Germany, there are powerful domestic 
constituencies which would react negatively to continued postponement of 
the enlargement issue. 
A second significant factor is that a NATO or an EU which failed to take 
on new members from East and Central Europe would have increasing 
difficulty in justifYing their historic purpose and mission. Even though enlarge-
ment will inevitably pose a difficult set of choices with some undoubted costs, 
to rigidly maintain the status quo could be even more costly. To perpetuate the 
division of Europe on the old Cold War East-West divide would symbolise a 
loss of political nerve and would inevitably appear as a failure adequately to 
respond to the post-Cold War unification of Europe. It would leave NATO 
and the EU appearing as cosy introspective clubs, more concemed about 
protecting their own high levels of security and prosperity rather than extend-
ing these benefits to those parts of Europe struggling to rid themselves oftheir 
communist legacy. Such a development would radically undermine the 
pretensions ofNA TO and the EU to represent a "community of shared 
values", which is open to all European states upholding the principles of 
democracy, a market economy, and the rule of law. 
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Barring a major change in plan, the NATO Summit in Madrid in July 
1997 will provide the first breakthrough in specifying the potential new 
members of NATO and setting out a clear timetable for their accession. In 
itself, this will be a major milestone and will require considerable political 
and diplomatic efforts and imagination to ensure that the Summit will be 
successfully managed. In one sense, the Summit will be the culmination of 
almost a decade of deliberation and planning. But, the decisions taken at the 
Summit will also be only the start of a new and even more complex phase 
as NA TO enlargement ceases to be a purely theoretical issue and is actually 
implemented and as the pressure on the EU to follow NATO's example 
becomes stronger. For the next 10-20 years, if not for longer, the issue of 
NA TO and EU enlargement will be a key strategic question in European 
and transatlantic politics. Inevitably, difficult choices will be confronted 
and decisions will have to be made. 
The importance of the issue of eastward enlargement cannot be over-
estimated. Its impact on Europe's future is self-evident. The nature and 
form of the response to the Central and Eastern Europe's requests for 
membership of NATO and the EU will be a critical determinant of the 
future shape of Europe - the future stability, the prosperity, and, on a 
deeper level, the very meaning of what it is to be a European - will be 
inextricably bound up with this issue. 
However, these decisions wiII also have a significance and impact 
transcending the specific European context. The United States has closer 
cultural affinities, more substantial economic interests, and deeper institu-
tionallinkages with Europe than with any other region of the world. How 
the United States responds to the progress towards NATO enlargement will 
inevitably have an impact on its policies towards these other regions. The 
NATO question will also be a significant factor in the United States internal 
domestic debate about its future foreign policy and geo-political role in the 
post-Cold War era. 
Finally, it should not be forgotten that Russia's destiny is always to be a 
European power, even though it can be doubted whether Russia will ever 
be fully European. As Robert Blackwill has eloquently emphasised; 
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There is 110 security problem 011 the [European] Continent that is not 
made more manageable through Russian co-operation, and none that 
does not become more intractable if Jvloscow defines its interests in 
w~ys that oppose JVestern objectives. 
The Russian dimension will be a critical factor in the deliberations over 
NA TO and EU enlargement, particularly the former against which Moscow 
has consistently placed itself in strong opposition. The manner in which 
Russian opposition is managed, the degree to which Russia feels itself 
excluded or included in the emerging European political, economic and 
security architecture, will have a significant impact on the future stability 
of Europe and the degree to which Russia will play a constructive or 
obstructive role in European affairs. All of this will also have an important 
affect both on Rus,sia's internal evolution, and on Russia's projection of its 
geo-political power to other non-European regions of the world. 
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Cha~ter 2: The challenge of easltwanl 
ex~ansion - institutional res~onses 
Chapter I set out the general problems and issues facing policy makers in 
the post-Cold War security environment. This chapter assesses the re-
sponses of the principal European institutions to this changed environment, 
focusing on the moves made towards eastward enlargement. NATO and 
the EU are the principal institutions which are analysed but there is also an 
assessment of the Western European Union which has had its own inde-
pendent pretensions for eastward enlargement. 
The issue ofNA TO enlargement will be first addressed, providing a 
detailed account ofNA TO's adaptation to the end of the Cold War since 
1989 and the various moves that the organisation has made towards 
extending its activities to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and 
to the countries of the former Soviet Union. NATO's future plans for 
enlargement of NATO to take on new members from Central and Eastern 
Europe will also be assessed. 
Second, the issue of EU enlargement to the countries of East and 
Central Europe will be analysed. This will include an account of the various 
economic and political issues which will need to be resolved in order for 
the EU to be in a position to adopt new members into the EU from Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
Finally, there will be an assessment of the prospects for full member-
ship of the WEU to be offered to the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Although the WEU remains institutionally independent of the EU, it 
was designated in the Maastricht Treaty as the "defence component of the 
EU". The WEU is also considered to be the European defence pillar of 
NA TO and some have argued that the WEU enlargement could potentially 
be an alternative to NATO enlargement. 
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NATO enlargement 
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949 with membership 
drawn from both sides of the North Atlantic. The signing of the Treaty 
reflected the need of the Western European countries to gain US assistance 
to seCure themselves from the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism, 
which had been become particularly acute after the 1948 communist take-
over in Czechoslovakia. 
There are three aspects of the formation of the Atlantic Alliance which 
have a continuing relevance to the post-Cold War era. The first is that, 
though the fears of a resurgent Germany were a significant factor in the 
formation of the alliance, the perceived threat from the Soviet Union was 
the principal catalyst. From its very beginnings, NATO was primarily an 
anti-Soviet alliance and it., organisational structures, doctrines and planning 
were predicated on the constant external threat posed by the Soviet Un-
ion's military power in Eastern Europe. The withdrawal of Soviet forces 
from Eastern Europe and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 posed, therefore, a profound challenge to the raison d'etre of 
NATO for which there were no clear historical analogies or parallels. This 
simple fact should not be forgotten in the post-Cold War enthusiasm to 
emphasise NATO's non-military political underpinnings. 
The second significant aspect of this early period was that the United 
States was initially reluctant to be drawn into a treaty-based European 
security arrangement. This reflected the deeply-embedded historical 
reservation against being drawn into "entangling alliances", particularly 
with the notoriously fickle and unreliable European states. As a result, the 
US first demanded that the Europeans should themselves provide evidence 
that they had made significant progress towards a collective defence 
arrangement. The 1948 Brussels Treaty between the UK, France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg was the main European response to this 
demand. The critical article 4 of this Treaty undertook that, ifany of the 
signatories became the object of an armed attack, they would "afford the 
party so attacked alI the military and other aid and assistance in their power". 
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In response to these European efforts, and the growing evidence during 
1948 of Soviet hegemonic ambitions, the US agreed to be a signatory of 
the North Atlantic Treaty. But, it is significant that, due to the continuing 
US reservations, the collective defence provision in the Washington Treaty 
was notably weaker than that provided in the Brussels Treaty. The famous 
article 5 of the Washington Treaty states that: 
an armed attack against one or more q( them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack againsllhem all and [ . .} if slIch 
an armed attack occurs, each of Ihem [ . .} will assisllhe ParI)' and 
Parlies so allacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert 
with the other Parties, such action it deems necessGI:J', including the use 
of armedforce, /0 restore and maintain the security qf the North 
At/antic area. 
A close reading of the article is significant because it actually provides for a 
far more conditional and less automatic response than has generally been 
assumed by NATO member states. In addition, the question of the inter-
pretation of article 5 will become a critical issue in the enlargement debate, 
as NA TO will need to clarify what security guarantees it will be providing 
to any new members from East and Central Europe. Some more conspira-
torially-inclined commentators from Europe argue that the US is pushing 
for enlargement so as ultimately to weaken its collective defence responsi-
bilities towards all NATO member states. A more literal interpretation of 
article 5 would accommodate such a weakening of US commitment, with a 
significant impact on the US nuclear guarantee in particular. 
The third aspect which can be drawn from this early period is some-
thing already mentioned in the previous section. This is the fact that NA TO 
was not conceived as purely a military alliance. The primacy ofa political 
alliance based on a shared set of values, a "community of shared values" 
was emphasised in the preamble to the Treaty which states that the Parties 
are determined to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisa-
tion of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual 
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liberty and the rule of law". In fact, the military aspects of the Alliance, in 
particular the integrated military structure, only evolved in response to the 
outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. In the post-Cold War era, the 
political dimension to the Alliance provides probably the most fundamental 
legitimation for NATO's continued existence. 
Sense of deja vu: the Cold War analogies 
It is also important to note that most ofthe post-Cold War dilemmas and 
problems facing NATO are not completely new and have some clear analogies 
and links with developments during the Cold War. First, the accession of new 
members into NATO is not new: Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, the 
Federal Republic ofGennany in 1955 and Spain acceded in 1982. All these 
accessions (as well as Italy's initial inclusion in the Alliance) involved, with 
varying degrees of intensity, similar anxieties, concerns and fears which have 
characterised the enlargement debate towards East and Central Europe. Also, 
although geo-political factors were central in the decision to accept these 
earlier members, a secondary but significant set of considerations was that 
such accessions would, in Strobe Tal bot's words, "promote democracy 
witllin NATO states and good relations among them".' 
Second, the existence of major transatlantic disputes between the United 
States and her European NA TO partners, which became so prominent during 
the Yugoslav conflict, has clear historical parallels. US-European differences 
were as frequent and often as acrimonious during the Cold War. 111e Suez 
crisis, the issue of US nUclear control and Western European influence on US 
nuclear policy in Europe, the Urengoy pipeline dispute in 1982, differences 
over the policy of detente - all of these issues, and many more, were constant 
sources offriction between the United States and her European NATO allies. 
Third, the issue of out-of-area actions by NATO is not a radical new 
departure in NATO discussions. There is nothing in the Charter to prohibit 
such actions, since the geographical delimitations set out in article 6 only refer 
to the collective defence obligations set out in article 5. There is nothing to 
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stop NATO member states engaging in collective actions outside these 
geographical limitations. During the I 980s, there was also discussion about 
the possibility of NATO becoming involved in operations in support of Persian 
Gulf security in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian 
revolution. Such discussions did not progress far because there were signifi-
cant divergencies between NATO member states uver policy towards the 
Persian Gulf region; and because there were fears that such actions might be 
seen as provocative by the Soviet Union and undermine NATO's avowedly 
defensive posture. Such concerns have clear analogies with the discussions 
belween NA TO member slates over the issue ofNA TO engagement in the 
former Yugoslavia or in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Finally, the attempt by NATO to forge concrete links with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and with the Soviet Union is not purely a post-
Cold War phenomenon. As early as 1963, the North Atlantic Council decided 
to seek measures which would achieve "a genuine and fundamental improve-
ment in East-West relations". This became translated into what was called the 
"Harmel exercise", named after the Belgian Foreign Minister who proposed 
the report of 1967, which set out a secondary function of NATO, beyond its 
first function of collective defence, to establish a more stable relationship with 
tl,e Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact. NATO, tllereby, 
became a central forum for the implementation of tlle policy of detente, 
providing its good offices to promote negotiations over such issues as the 
German question, arms control and balanced force reductions in Europe. 
NATO also sanctioned, and was closely involved with, the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and over the Vienna Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reduction negotiations (MBFR). Thus, for a long period prior 
to the end of the Cold war, NATO was engaged in a process of dialogue 
and co-operation with its Eastern counterparts. 
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1990 and the unification of Germany 
The revolutions in Central Europe in November-December 1989 did initiate 
a strategic transformation in Europe which had no comparable analogy 
with any of the developments of the previous forty years. As such, they 
demanded a respunse from NATO which recognised the extraordinary 
nature of these events. This was first provided at the London Summit in 
July 1990 where the London Declaration invited the six Warsaw Pact 
countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the 
Soviet Union) to visit Brussels to address the North Atlantic Council. It also 
invited these governments to establish regular diplomatic liaison with 
NA TO and to share thinking and deliberations and to intensify military 
contacts. Later that year, new liaison ambassadors from the Warsaw Pact 
participated in briefings at NATO headquarters. 
The next major development was the transformation of East Germany 
from a key Warsaw Pact member in November 1989 to a full member of 
NA TO in October 1990, representing the first major expansion ofNA TO 
eastward. The negotiations over the security framework for a united 
Germany underwent a number of twists and turns and have left a contro-
versial legacy. Russia, in particular, has argued that the NA TO commit-
ment, first articulated in 1993, to take on new members from Central and 
Eastern Europe goes against the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement for 
East Germany to be incorporated into NATO. 
At the start of the negotiations, the Soviet government was strongly 
opposed la the Germany-in-NA TO framework and this was reiterated by 
President Gorbachev in his meeting with President Bush in June 1990. 
However, in Garbachev's meeting with Chancellor Kohl in July 1990, 
Gorbachev made the critical concession that, in the wake of Germany's 
unification, its eastern part might be unilaterally pulled out of the Warsaw 
Pact and integrated into NATO, so long as no nuclear weapons nor any 
foreign troops would be permitted to be deployed there. The reason for 
Gorbachev making this concession was principally due to the failure of the 
East German government to stabilise its domestic situation as a reformist 
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communist state in November 1989. As de facto unification had taken 
place on I July 1990 with the economic and monetary union orthe two 
German states, Garbachev realised his infl uence over developments had 
dramatically weakened. As well as agreeing to the NATO concession, 
Gorbachev also agreed that all-German elections could take place irrespec-
tive of the Two-plus-Four agreement which was signed 011 12 September 
1990. 
However, it is widely believed in Moscow that the 1990 negotiations 
were predicated on the understanding that there would be no further 
NA TO expansion. Sergei Karaganov, a leading Russian security figure, 
articulates this grievance eloquently: 
In 1990 we were told quite clearly by the West that the unification of 
Germany would nOllead to NATO expansion. We did not demand 
written guarantees because in the euphoric atmosphere C!fthe time it 
H'ould have seemed indecent - like Iwo girlji·iends giving written 
promises 170110 seduce each other's husbands. III 
Although it is always difficult to adjudicate over disputes where there is no 
written record, a number of points can still be made. First, the Western 
participants deny that any such informal guarantees were made. Second, at 
the time of the negotiations the Warsaw Pact still existed and was expected 
to continue to exist, not least by the Soviet government. Third, at that time 
NA TO member states were in no way contemplating any further expansion 
of NATO and nor, whilst the Warsaw Pact was still in existence, were any 
of the states of Central and Eastern Europe making requests for NA TO 
expansion. The evidence indicates, therefore, that the Russian grievance is 
probably more an exercise in retrospective wishful thinking than an accu-
rate reflection of the substance of the negotiations at the time. 
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1991 and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
However, the fast pace of developments during 1991, not least the Soviet 
coup in August and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact earlier in the year, 
forced the issue ofNA TO expansion onto the agenda. In reaction to the 
Soviet coup, there emergeu the first direct calls by the Central and Eastern 
Europeans for full membership of NATO, expressed most notably by 
President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia. ll NATO, for its part, struggled 
to find a response which would adequately express the reality of a defini-
tive end to the Cold War, as well as protect the agreements secured on the 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Strategic Arms Reductions 
Talks agreements (START) signed earlier in the year. 
At the SummiUn Rome in November 1991 NATO responded to these 
challenges by articulating a New Strategic Concept which recognised that 
the threats of the past had been superseded and that the remaining "secu-
rity challenges and risks" were "multi-faceted and multi-directional". The 
three risks which were identified were those of a resurgent Russia, Islamic 
fundamentalism from the South, and instability in Central and Eastern 
Europe. NATO's doctrine was also re-defined to include the three pillars of 
"defence, dialogue and co-operation", adding a new third pillar to the 
Harmel doctrine of "'defence and dialogue". To put flesh on these doctrinal 
reforms and to consolidate the idea of "security for a Europe whole and 
free", there was announced the formation of the North Atlantic Co-
operation Council (NACC) to whose inaugural session in December 1991 
all members of the former Warsaw Pact Treaty were invited. With the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, all the newly independent states were 
also invited to join the Council, including the states of Central Asia, which 
broadened the membership to 35 (the membership in 1997 stands at 38). 
The inaugural meeting was little more than a formal get-together but at 
the March 1992 meeting a "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Co-
operation" was developed which covered a range of topics: political and 
security related matters, defence planning and military matters, defence 
conversion, economic issues, science, challenges of modern society, 
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dissemination of information, policy planning consultations, and air-traffic 
management. NACC, whose most high-level gathering is an annual Ministe-
rial meeting, has a defence counterpart in the Group on Defence Matters, 
and has also spawned parallel committees at the Defence Planning Commit-
tee and Military Committee levels. Much ofNACC's work has focused on 
the sphere of civil-military relations, with various initiatives on the role of 
the military in a democratic society. In March 1993, NACC also initiated a 
programme of co-operation in the area of peacekeeping, which suggested 
that NACC members might join with NA TO forces in peacekeeping 
operations. Attached to NACC there was also instituted a High Level 
Working Group that has been dealing with the implementation ofCFE and 
its successor CFE-l A which sets national limits on manpower limits. 
Yet, however active and generative of initiatives the NACC Forum could 
be presented, there was little that could be done to disguise its deficiencies 
as seen from the perspective of the Central and Eastern European countries 
seeking membership. These states became increasingly disillusioned with 
NACC for a number of reasons. First, the NACC relationship did not offer 
any security guarantees and did not specify any timetable, or establish any 
criteria, for accession. Given that this was their key objective, the "prize" 
they sought from NATO, this was bound to be a source of considerable 
disappointment. Second, the absence of any substantial financial contribu-
tions towards the initiatives developed by NACC meant that the emphasis 
was far more on "dialogue" than the much trumpeted "partnership" which 
was supposedly being offered. Third, NACC's inclusion of all the states of 
the former Soviet Union, most controversially the non-European states of 
Central Asia, resulted in a large, unwieldy body not very different from the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. For the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, this degraded NACC into a glorified talking 
shop which had little substantive impact or decision making capabilities. In 
addition, the inclusiveness ofNACC was perceived by the Central and 
Eastern European countries as morally failing to differentiate between the 
historical victims and the historical aggressors of the post-World War 11 
settlement. 
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1993 and the enlargement issue 
However, the difficulty faced by the NATO member states was that these 
criticisms did reflect the underlying logic behind the creation ofNACC. 
First, the absence of any provision for extending NA TO security guaran-
lees reOedeu the strong disposition against accepting new members from 
Central and Eastern Europe into the alliance. This was partly due to a fear 
that such an enlargement would weaken and undermine the alliance, since 
the aspirant members were felt to be incapable of meeling the high stand-
ards and responsibilities demanded of membership and also, in many 
instances, had significant unresolved disputes with their neighbours. There 
was also domestic political considerations over the wisdom of extending 
security guarantees, given that this would depend on domestic public 
support which had been promised the benefits of the "peace dividend". In 
this regard, it is important to remember that any new member of NATO 
has to be approved by the executives and the parliaments of all of the 16 
allies. 
Second, the policy of equal treatment of all the states of Central and 
Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union was established deliber-
ately. This was driven by the determination not to alienate Russia in its 
difficult period of transition towards democracy and a market economy. In 
simple terms, there was the fear that the Russian generals would not 
accept such a re-orientation of NA TO strategy and that, if this was pro-
moted, they would seek to undermine Yeltsin's liberalising and pro-Western 
policies. On a more abstract level, the policy of equal treatment was also 
predicated on the desire not to draw new lines and divisions in Europe. To 
select certain countries for membership would inevitably mean the exclu-
sion of others, which would only increase rather than lessen their sense of 
insecurity. This problem was only accentuated by the fact that the most 
likely first candidates, the so-called Visegrad countries of Central Europe -
Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics - enjoyed relatively 
greater security and stability than the countries to their East, such as 
Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania. To increase 
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the Yisegrad countries' security through NATO membership would only 
establish a zone of far greater insecurity to their East. 
Nevertheless, although these arguments continued to have salience, 
there emerged during 1993 a growing mood in certain Western capitals that 
the NACC solution was not satisfactory and that the issue of enlargement 
had to be confronted. The first hint of this came in Spring J 993 IISS 
annual lecture, when the German Defence Minister, Yolker ROhe, argued 
that certain countries of Central Europe, namely the Yisegrad four of 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, should be selected for 
early membership of NATO prior to EU membership, at the latest by the 
year 2000."The reason for this shift of policy was primarily due to the 
increasing difficulty the German government had in refusing to support the 
Central Europeans' requests for membership. [n particular, the German 
government found it difficult to reject the Central Europeans' argument 
that, if NATO was not just a security but also a political alliance, why 
should their requests for membership not be acceded to. The logic of this 
line of argument was, in many ways, irrefutable. [fNA TO was a commu-
nity of shared values, and if the ex-communist countries now accepted. 
and were making substantive moves towards realising these shared values, 
what argument could there be against their eventual inclusion in the alli-
ance? 
With the Gennan government setting the ball rolling, the momentum for 
enlargement then shifted to the other side of the Atlantic. In the United States, 
the question ofNA TO enlargement was driven, to a large degree, by a sense 
of increasing frustration at the seeming impotence and lack of purpose of 
NATO in the post-Cold War era. The indecisiveness ofNA TO's role in the 
fonner Yugoslavia fuelled this frustration, which then became deflected into 
criticisms of NATO's perceived failure to embrace the new democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe. In August 1993, Senator Lugar expressed this 
sense of exasperation when he stated that: "The common denominator of all 
the new security problems in Europe is that they lie beyond NATO's current 
borders [ ... ] NATO must either develop the strategy and structure to go out 
of area or it will go out of business".lJ 
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The Clinton administration, however, remained cautious over NA TO 
enlargement. In particular, there was strong opposition from within the 
Pentagon, which sought to protect NATO's military capabilities, and from 
important constituencies in the State Department, who were concerned not 
to provoke Russia. However, Clinton was himself attracted to a policy of 
enlargement as a vehicle for differentiating his administration's policy from 
his predecessor's. In addition., domestic politics impinged as the mid-term 
elections in late 1993 drew closer and the almost 23 million voters with 
Central European ancestry became a significant electoral force. In Septem-
ber and October as the elections loomed, a number of statements made by 
the administration suggested that enlargement was now firmly on the 
agenda. 
The momentum towards NATO enlargement was also promoted by. 
Yeltsin's visit to Warsaw in September J 993 and the final communique 
which stated that Polish membership of NATO would not be contrary to 
Russian interests. 14 Although the Warsaw statement was in reality far more 
ambiguous than the literal interpretation suggested, and gained an immedi-
ate adverse reaction by important constituencies in Moscow, most notably 
the military, it considerably strengthened the pro-enlargement school in 
Washington. However, the December 1993 elections in Russia, with the 
success of the ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, swung the pendulum 
back to the more cautious approach. But, with the NA TO Summit in 
January approaching, this more cautious attitude confronted the increased 
urgency and stridency of the Central and Eastern Europeans' requests for 
membership, which was a natural reaction to Zhirinovsky's openly neo-
imperialist calls for Russian expansionism and even the partition of Poland. 
1994 and Partnership for Peace 
Throughout J 993, a number of options were considered for how to 
respond to the enlargement issue. One suggestion was an associate mem-
bership could be offered, providing the consultative provisions of article 4 
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but not the security guarantees of article 5. This was rejected as an inad-
equate response to the Central and Eastern Europeans' requests and as 
insufficient to gain their approval and support. Another proposal was to 
link NATO enlargement with EU enlargement. The United States was 
unhappy with this as it constrained their freedom of action to specifically 
European developments. It was also felt to be artificially linking two 
different processes with their diverging pre-conditions and trajectories for 
membership. 
The eventual compromise that was reached at the Brussels Summit in 
January 1994 consisted of three elements as set out by President Clinton. 
First, he called upon the NA TO allies to commit themselves to the principle 
of NATO expansion. Second, he caJled for a new and more intensive form 
of relations with Russia. And, third, he proposed the Partnership for Peace 
as NATO's new military co-operation programme with non-NATO states 
which would, in the words of the Summit Declaration, "forge new security 
relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for 
Peace", 
It became clear during the Summit that the central and most developed 
of these elements was the PFP programme. The details of NA TO enlarge-
ment (and the proposed new relationship with Russia) were left vague and 
ambiguous. The immediate response of the Central and Eastern Europeans 
was, as a result, broadly unenthusiastic, viewing PFP as yet another device 
to avoid the enlargement issue. A number of Western commentators were 
similarly disappointed. Henry Kissinger bemoaned the fact that NATO had 
missed an historic opportunity to expand whilst Russia was still weak. 
There was some justification for this initial scepticism over PFP. 
Partnership did not offer the much prized article 5 security guarantees, 
instead only offering the right to consult NATO allies in the determination 
of a threat to security as set out in article 4. Also, PFP did not breach the 
principle of inclusiveness established by NACC, even extending the princi-
ple by inviting all CSCE as well as NACC members to become Partners. By 
1996, this had resulted in there being 27 Partners. In addition, the five 
objectives of PFP did not establish anything which NACC had not itself 
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sought to achieve. These tlve objectives were: To tacilitate transparency in 
national defence planning and budgeting processes; to ensure democratic 
control of defence forces; to maintain the capability and readiness to 
contribute to operations under the authority ofthe UN andlor CSCE; to 
develop co-operative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint 
planning, training and exerci!)t;!!:i in order to strengthen their ability to 
undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, 
humanitarian operations and others as may be subsequently agreed; and to 
develop over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with 
those of the members orthe North Atlantic Alliance. 
Although these provisions did not offer any radically new departures, 
PFP did nevertheless include some signiticant developments in comparison 
with NACC. First, despite broadening the potential membership, PFP did 
indirectly breach the principle of equality of treatment through the concept 
of Individual Partnership Programmes (JPP). IPPs allow each country to 
agree on a programme of activities with NATO and to develop its Partner-
ship at its own pace and within its preferred scope. This permits a consid-
erable degree of self-differentiation between Partners, with those countries 
seeking NATO membership having the opportunity to develop more intense 
relations with NATO, whilst allowing those countries seeking a weaker 
institutional link the freedom to establish more limited areas of co-opera-
tion. By 1996, 17 IPPs had been established which had led to bilateral 
relationships between NATO and Partner countries of differing content and 
intensity. This represents a signitlcant evolution of the NA TO-NACC 
arrangement, permitting a degree of self-differentiation not present earlier. 
The second major advance was in the content of the partnership 
offered by PFP. PFP offered a significant shift from NACC's emphasis on 
dialogue on doctrinal issues to concrete measures for enhancing operational 
co-operation and joint action, which was provided explicitly through a 
framework for NA TO-Partners joint action for peacekeeping operations. In 
this regard, there were five most significant innovations in the PFP pro-
gramme. These were: PFP operating under the authority of the North 
Atlantic Council, tram the 16 allies, rather than NACC. The formation ofa 
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Partnership Co-ordination Cell at Mons, Belgium, alongside SHAPE. This 
greatly facilitates communications between NATO and Partners, particu-
larly when it comes to planning an operation such as the NATO peace 
Implementation Force (IFOR - SFOR from late december 1996). The 
promotion of interoperability has been made the primary military objective 
under PFP. NATO has already made available over 800 standardisation 
documents, which are being progressively incorporated into Partner's 
military doctrine, concepts of operations and standard operating proce-
dures. In January 1995, a biennial Planning and Review Process was 
introduced, which mirrors NATO's long-standing defence planning sys-
tem. This, in turn, will have a significant influence in moving interested 
parties towards greater interoperability with NATO forces. 
All these mechanisms of PFP contribute significantly to cultivating a 
multinational peacekeeping capability for interested Partner members, in 
which interoperability between NATO and Partner forces is promoted -
this also being the most stringent and difficult pre-condition for entry as 
full members of NATO. The engagement of 13 Partners in the SFOR bears 
witness to the fruits of these developments. 
Finally, however, PFP represented a significant development from 
NACC in that it was linked, if rather ambiguously and indirectly, with the 
commitment to NATO taking on new members. However, the inherent 
ambiguity only accentuated the demands of the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries for the modalities of NATO enlargement to be made more 
specific. 
1995 and the NATO iEnlargement Studll 
The January 1994 Brussels Summit left many unanswered questions over 
NATO enlargement and its connection with PFP. Was NA TO enlargement 
a separate process from PFP and, if not, how did PFP contribute to 
enlargement? Did PFP truly play, as promised at the Summit, '"an important 
role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NA TO" or was it, as 
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its critics suggested, a mechanism for effectively stalling the process? In a 
similar vein, was PFP principally a means for placating Russia and con-
firming that NATO enlargement had been indefinitely postponed or was it a 
genuine exercise in preparing participating countries for membership? 
In attem pting to answer these questions, Western leaders tended 
throughout 1994 to send contradictory signals. In Warsaw in July 1994, 
Clinton stated categorically that the issue ofNA TO enlargement "is no 
longer a question of whether, but when and how. And that expansion will 
not depend on the appearance of a new threat in Europe"." However, 
earlier in the year a joint US-Russia declaration described PFP as an 
"important element of an emerging new European Security architecture", 
which suggested that PFP was intended to become a permanent structure 
rather than a preparatory process for NA TO membership. Added credence 
to this view was given at a press conference in August 1994, where Yeltsin 
expressed his satisfaction than NATO had not been expanded. Russia's 
agreement to sign the PFP Framework Document in June 1994 appeared to 
reflect this growing confidence over the postponement of NATO enlarge-
ment. 
It came as a surprise to Russia, therefore, and to many other commen-
tators, that the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in December 1994 
decided to initiate a specific study on enlargement. Russia expressed its 
disappointment by refusing to sign the JPP, and the agreement for a 
political relationship outside PFP, which had been prepared for the Decem-
ber meeting. The reasons why NATO decided to take this next step on the 
enlargement question can again be primarily linked to US leadership. Three 
factors appeared to be infiuential. First, domestic pressures played their 
part with the Republicans' "Contract with America", stating that Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia should be in a position to join 
NATO no later than 10 January 1999. Second, continuing exasperation 
over NA TO policy in Bosnia fuelled the momentum for NA TO expansion. 
And, third and perhaps most critically, the 1993 Russian elections had 
weakened the "Russia First" policy ofthe State Department and had led to 
a growing consensus that enlargement, promoted through PFP, might be a 
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necessary precaution against things going badly wrong in Russia. 
However, the NATO Enlargement study which was published in 
September 1995 only partially clarified the ambiguities and issues raised by 
enlargement.!(' Clearly reflecting its committee origins in the US govern-
ment, it showed all the signs of a compromise between State Department 
concerns not to alienate Russia, the Clinton administration's wish to 
enlarge NATO and the Pentagon's desire not to militarily weaken NATO. 
Critically, the study did not address the question of "who" might be the 
first candidates or "when" they might be admitted, confining itself to more 
general questions of "why and how". In addition, it did not specify any 
explicit conditions for entry, barring the well-known general conditions, 
arguing that such criteria could only be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Nevertheless, the study did make a number of significant points, which 
were admittedly buried in the broad generalities offered in the bulk of the 
document. 
On the question of why the alliance should take on new members the 
study reiterated the normal considerations of how it would enhance stabil-
ity and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. But, it stressed 
that "new members will enjoy all the rights and assume all obligations of 
membership under the Washington Treaty". It also confirmed that PFP will 
continue to have a role as both preparing candidates for membership and 
for strengthening relations "with partner countries that may be unlikely to 
join the alliance early or at all". It was also emphasised that NATO enlarge-
ment "complements the enlargement of the EU, a parallel process that also, 
for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability to 
the new democracies in the East". Finally, it made the important point that 
ultimately it would be the 16 allies which would decide by consensus on 
whether to invite new members "according to their judgement of whether 
doing so will contribute to security and stability in the North Atlantic area". 
Thus, the success of aspirant members' fulfilling the criteria for entry 
could only be a necessary not a sufficient condition for accession. 
On the question of how the study first examined how enlargement 
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would contribute to stability and security, focusing particularly on Russia 
and those initially excluded from membership. In this regard, it stated that 
the enlargement did not imply the demarcation of "spheres of influence" in 
Europe and that the alliance considers it desirable to develop the NA TO-
Russia relationship through the IPP and the enhanced NATO-Russia 
dialogue formally accepteu by Russia in May 1995. The study also stressed 
that the alliance attaches "particular importance to our relations with 
Ukraine". But, it was also made clear that "no country outside the alliance 
should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process and decisions" 
of enlargement, which clearly implicitly referred to Russia. 
Next, the study focused on how enlargement will strengthen the 
effectiveness of the alliance. It first made clear that new members must 
accept the full obligations of the Washington Treaty, particularly the 
military obligations under Article 5. The study then proceeded to its most 
controversial points. First, whilst it outlined the various forms that allies 
contribute to NA TO collective defence, most notably the French and 
Spanish variations, it made clear the preference for new allies to accept full 
participation in the integrated military structure and the collective defence 
planning process. As onc NATO official expressed it informally, "we want 
no new France's or Spain's". Second, whilst it was stressed that there 
was no "a priori requirement for the stationing of alliance troops on the 
territory of new members", this should not be "foreclosed as an option". 
Similarly, whilst there was no "a priori requirement for the stationing of 
nuclear weapons on the territory of new members" and that, in the present 
international climate the current nuclear posture would suffice, NATO 
would want to maintain "its right to modify its nuclear posture as circum-
stances warrant". 
Finally, on the question of what aspirant members needed to do to 
prepare for membership, it was reiterated that there would be no "second 
tier security guarantees for members and no modifications of the Washing-
ton Treaty for those who join". New members would be full members with 
all the associated responsibilities and obligations. The political requirements 
for membership added nothing new to the list of good neighbourly rela-
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tions, respect for human rights, commitment to the market economy and 
democracy, and the establishment of civilian control of the military. On the 
military front, it was stressed that involvement in prp was a critical 
mechanism for gaining improvements in interoperability but that, since PFP 
was limited to peacekeeping operations, it was not sufficient. Thus, in 
order for aspirant members to be capable of fulfilling the requirements for 
collective defence, there was the need for expanded efforts towards 
standardisation and, as such, there would need to be a "country-by-
country assessment of prospective members" standardisation", dealing 
with the "more than 1,200 agreements and publications that new members 
should undertake to comply with". 
Steps towards the NATO Summit in Madrid in July 1997 
Since the publication of the Enlargement study, NATO has set itself three 
principal tasks to implement for the NA TO Summit in July 1997. The NATO 
Ministerial meeting in December 1996 in Bmssels confirmed that progress had 
been made and that the Madrid Summit would see the first new members 
from Central and Eastern Europe being fonnally invited to join the organisation 
as full members. 
These three tasks towards enlargement include: First, country-by-country 
assessments of prospective new NATO members, noting in particular their 
technical and military preparedness for membership, which will be used in the 
final political decision of detennining which countries will join. Second, the 
development and enhancing of aNA TO-Russia relationship, in particular 
seeking to give concrete expression to the NATO-Russia dialogue which was 
agreed with Russia in May 1995. At the December 1996 Bmssels meeting, 
NATO foreign ministers confinned that greater urgency will be given to this 
task, so as to ensure that taking on new NATO members does not damage 
NATO's relations witl1 Russia. Third, developing and enhancing NATO's prp 
relationships with those countries which will not be included as the first 
candidates for membership. 
eUENCf $lUDI(!; 1/199 41 
The first of these tasks is perhaps the least difficult of the three. Since 
April 1996 individualised dialogues with aspirant members have taken place 
and are expected to continue till Spring 1997. These dialogues are limited to 
technical military issues, such as budgeting, command structure, the 
presence of foreign troops, the stationing of nuclear weapons, the pre-
positioning of equipment, intelligence sharing, and integration into the force 
planning process. It is important to stress that these reports cannot deter-
mine "who" will to be the first candidate(s) nor "when" they will be 
scheduled to join NA TO. This can only be a political decision taken by 
consensus of the 16 allies, most probably at the Madrid Summit in July 
1997. Membership negotiations will then take place well into 1998. It is 
also highly probable that the first candidates will be drawn from Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. But, so as to minimise the costs both 
financial and political, it could be the case that only one of these countries 
will be selected in the first instance. 
The second ofthe tasks - the desire to develop a more intensive NA TO-
Russia relationship - is a far more difficult proposition. The essential 
problem is that Russia has consistently maintained its opposition to NATO 
enlargement and made it clear that any intensification of a NATO-Russia 
partnership is conditional on NATO not taking on new members. Admit-
tedly, there have been occasional cracks in the seemingly unconditional 
Russian rejection of NA TO enlargement, the most well-known of which 
was Yeltsin's Warsaw statement in September 1993. But, as noted above, 
this seeming approval of Polish membership was rapidly reversed. Since 
then, Western diplomats and commentators have regularly been reassured 
that the Russian position has been moderated only later to find out that the 
essential underlying opposition to NATO enlargement remains unchanged. 
Russia is, though, a country attuned to the demands of realpolitik. If 
NA TO enlargement is to take place regardless of Russian opposition and, 
given that Russia is not in a position to obstruct such a move, Moscow will 
seek to obtain the greatest concessions as possible from NATO and its 
governments. The dilemma for Western governments will be to find some 
compromise which will satisfy Russia's minimal demands without under-
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mining the objectives and aims of eastward enlargement. The trouble is 
that, at least in the security field, such a compromise will be difficult to 
find. Russia's key demand is to have a real voice in European security 
matters, meaning in the tinal analysis the right of co-decision making and 
the implicit right of veto, which Western governments will not be willing to 
concede. The critical question is whether Russia will, when it comes to the 
crunch, accept the enhanced consultative mechanisms and the more 
developed structures for cooperation which will probably be the most that 
the West wiII offer in exchange for deferring to Russian sensibilities over 
enlargement. This issue is dealt with in greater length in chapter 3 and in 
the conclusions. 
The third task, of defining new security relations with countries not 
accepted as first candidates for membership, is perhaps even more difficult 
than the Russian issue. Robert Hunter, the US ambassador to NATO, has 
offered some conceptual guidelines by suggesting that PFP would be 
furthered 
la enable countries that are fit/I participants to have a permanent 
associalion with NATO Ihal is a close as possible, shorl o/a/ormal 
membership. We wallllO make the dijjerence between being a Parlner 
and being an Ally razor thin; so that eve,y nation, ally or partner, can 
share ill Ihe promise a/a secure fillure in a peacefi.il Europe. 17 
This suggests that a beefed-up PFP would be the probable avenue for reassur-
ing those countries which are excluded, perhaps pemlanently, from tlle first 
tranche of memberships. To some extent, moves have already been made in 
this direction by the development of a NATO-Ukraine dialogue, modelled 
closely on the NATO-Russia model. 
However, it is difficult to see how substantial progress on this issue can be 
made until the decision is made as to who and when the first candidate(s) will 
be and the response to that decision by Russia. Until such time, there is no 
strategic compass available for detennining the nature and content of the type 
of relationship which NATO would be required to adopt. 
Dt'.FfJ .. 'CE STUDIES 1/1997 43 
EU enlargement 
In the international media, the question ofNA TO enlargement has received 
far greater attention and coverage than the closely connected issue of EU 
enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This is not 
because governments, or the general public, feel that the issue of EU 
enlargement is less important tl,an NATO expansion. Indeed, there is a 
widely-held view that incorporation of Central and Eastern Europe into the 
EU is critically important to the future stability and prosperity of the region 
and that, in the longer term, it will have a greater and more profound 
impact on the region than the benefits conferred through membership of 
NATO. 
This view has a convincing logic and rationale. Ultimately, for all its 
ambitions to have a political purpose and role, NATO remains prinCipally 
focused on the military and defence sphere. The EU, in contrast, has a 
much wider mandate, involving itself far more deeply with the economic, 
social and political dimensions of its constituent nation-states. As such, the 
EU is justifiably considered to be a more effective catalyst than NATO in 
promoting the economic, political and social reforms which are the critical 
pre-conditions for the future prosperity and stability of Central and Eastern 
Europe. As a result, rew dissent from the view that EU enlargement is.i ust 
as, if not more, significant than NATO enlargement. At the very least, it is 
accepted that the processes of NATO and EU expansion should be closely 
co-ordinated and move, as far as possible, in convergence with one 
another. 
Given the importance of EU enlargement, there remains the apparent 
paradox of why the issue has not received wider public attention. One 
factor is that the issue has never been perceived as controversial or prob-
lematic as NATO expansion. The end of the Cold War never engendered 
the same level of debate or questioning of the raison d'etre of the EU as 
was the case with NATO. It was taken for granted that the EU would have 
a continuing role and function whilst NA TO had a far more difficult task in 
re-defining itself for the post-Cold War era. This was also rellected in EU 
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and NA TO attitudes to Central and Eastern Europe. As early as 1989, 
Jacques Delors accepted that the EU would have to accept new members 
from Central and Eastern Europe, whilst NATO was much slower in 
coming to similar conclusions. In addition, the EU, in contrast to NA TO, 
never had to confront Russian opposition to its enlargement plans. Indeed, 
Russia has been surprisingly supportive of EU expansion, welcoming 
Finland's accession to the EU and even approving Lithuania's application to 
join the EU in striking contrast to its unambiguous opposition to that 
country's NATO ambitions. 
The fact that EU enlargement is, in principle, less controversial than 
NATO enlargement is undoubtedly one important factor for it not receiving 
the same amount of media attention. But, a further associated factor 
reflects the perception, at least among the wider public, that the process of 
EU enlargement has advanced as far, if not further, than NATO enlarge-
ment. In comparison with NATO's continuing ambiguity over which 
countries will be the first candidates for membership, the EU has defined a 
clearer position. In the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, 10 countries 
(Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak republics, the Baltic countries, 
Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria) were identified as the prospective candi-
dates for accession. In the Essen Summit one year later, detailed and 
extensive pre-accession strategies were defined for the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe to adopt in preparation for accession. In addition, some 
EU leaders have given the clear impression that the Central European 
countries are on the fast track to membership. One notable example was 
Chancellor Kohl's promise in July 1995 that Poland could hope to be a 
member of the EU by the year 2000" Such statements have only strength-
ened the general perception that the dynamic of EU integration eastward is 
more advanced and is encountering fewer obstacles than the NATO 
enlargement process. 
However, in reality, as will be argued below, the position ofthe EU 
towards the challenge of eastward enlargement is far less advanced than is 
generally supposed. Indeed, NATO is in fact much closer to accepting new 
members from the East than the EU. Whilst it could be the case that some 
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Central European countries will be members ofNA TO before the year 2000, it 
is highly unlikely that any of them will be even close to EU membership. 
One reason for this increasing divergence is that the demands made on the 
Central and Eastern European countries for EU membership are more strin-
gent and difficult to implement than those required for NATO. This is perhaps 
a more justified cause for delay, given the far larger acquis coml1lul1ilaire 
which the EU has accumulated than anything comparable within NA TO. 
But, this is not the whole story. Another critical factor is that, in reality, the 
EU has found it more difficult than NATO to engage in the necessary internal 
institutional reforms to be in a position to accept new members from the East. 
Whilst NA TO has focused a large part of its attention to the demands of 
Central and Eastern Europe, such as with NACC and the PF?, the EU has 
been almost completely engrossed in its internal affairs. The Maastricht legacy 
of monetary union and the ambition for a full political union within the existing 
EU has overshadowed any discussion about what to do with those countries 
outside the union, particularly the relatively conflict-free countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The fact that tl,e 1996-97 IGC is dealing almost solely 
with internal institutional refonns is paradigmatic of the EU's inward-looking 
orientation. In addition, the fact that the existing EU countries have such 
radically differing policy positions towards these internal issues contributes to 
the further marginalisation of the eastward enlargement question. As will be 
argued below, this will inevitably have negative repercussions for the fast 
accession of countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 
The reality is, therefore, that the EU is emerging as far less prepared than 
NATO for the issue of eastward enlargement. TIle reasons, and the implica-
tions for this, will be addressed in the rest of this section. These internal 
problems are also tl,e principal reasons why the EU is finding it so difficult to 
define a cohesive security and defence identity, which was envisioned in the 
Maastricht Treaty to be developed through the CFSP and the WEU. Later in 
the chapter, it will be argued that for similar reasons, it is highly unlikely that 
the WEU will be in a position to offer any realistic alternative to NATO for the 
security requirements of Central and Eastern Europe. 
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EU enlargement· the historical legacy 
Like NA TO, the EU has had considerable experience of accepting new 
members. From the original six countries which signed the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, which formed the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) in 1957 and the European Communities (EC) in 
1967 (Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands), Britain, the Republic oflreland and Denmarkjoined in 1973; Greece 
joined in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986; and Austria, Finland and 
Sweden were accepted as new members of what had now become the 
European Union in 1995. The cumulative experience of all these accessions 
to the EU has meant that there are clearly defined guidelines and proce-
dures for those countries seeking admission to join the EU and reasonably 
well-established pre-conditions for the economic, social and political 
reforms required for any application to be favourably considered. In 
general, the EC and the EU has always sought to keep its doors open to 
new potential members which can fultil the pre-conditions and contribute 
to the goals of the Union. 
However, where the EU has differed from NATO has been in its 
gradual development towards increasing integration and the building of 
supranational institutions and decision-making structures. Whilst the 
integrated military structure ofNA TO was broadly established in the 
I 950s, the EC/EU has engaged in a more evolutionary process of integra-
tion. The reasons for this go to the heart of the logic and rationale of the 
process of European integration. After the failure in the 1950s to create a 
political union or a defence union (the proposed European Political Union 
and the European Defence Community), the architects of European inte-
gration envisioned a deliberately evolutionary process, starting with the less 
controversial economic aspects but always conceiving that this would only 
be an initial stepping stone to a final destination of a political union. As 
Christoph Bertram has rightly stated: 
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The Union's plilpose has always been political ra/her than economic. 
The idea behind European integration is primarily about power - the 
domestication (!f power through the domestication of intro-s/ate politics 
and the joining qlpower 10 again give Europe a voice in the world f'I 
This can clearly be seen in the historical development of the process of 
European integration. From the ECSC in 1952, the Treaty of Rome in 1957 
established the European Economic Community; in 1967, the ECSC, the 
EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community were amalgamated into 
the EC and in 1968, a customs union was formed; and in 1987, the Single 
European Act was established which created an internal market for the free 
movement of "goods, persons, services and capital". The culmination of 
this process was the Maastricl1t Treaty in 1992 which sought to create "an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" through a timetable for 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the development of a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy which, in turn, envisioned "the eventual 
framing of a common defence policy". 
Maastricht watershed 
The Maastricht Treaty, though, has become a major watershed in the 
process of European integration. The problem that many countries had in 
gaining popular support for the ratification of the Treaty, alongside the 
controversial opt-out clauses to the Treaty gained by Britain and Denmark, 
reflected growing scepticism over the rationale and justification for in-
creasing European integration. The sense of popular disenchantment with 
European integration has only been accentuated by the social and economic 
costs of the EU countries seeking to satisfy the criteria for EMU. To a 
much greater degree than earlier, there has been a real questioning amongst 
European elites whether the idea of "an ever closer union" is something 
which the peoples of Europe genuinely want. 
But, this represented only half of the problems facing the implementa-
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tion of the Maastricht Treaty. The paradox was that this exercise in greatly 
expanding the process of integration within Western Europe took place at 
the very time that Europe had become re-united with the liberation of 
Central and Eastern Europe from Soviet rule. Those who negotiated the 
Treaty almost consciously ignored these revolutionary developments. 
However, the necessary implications have;: not taken long to come to the 
surface. The presence of a large number of European countries to the East, 
with their very complex communist legacies, legitimately requesting 
membership of the EU has inevitably raised the issue of whether an in-
creasingly integrated EU would be capable of responding to their requests. 
In the language of the EU, this has starkly raised the question of whether 
the process of "deepening" is compatible with the demands of "widening" 
the Union. 
But, even more fundamentally, the question has been asked whether the 
process of increasing integration has not been undermined by the end of 
the Cold War. As has been argued in the previous chapter, the Cold War 
did have a significant influence on the process of European integration by 
providing a constant external threat. With that threat removed, there has 
inevitably been a weakening of a common sense of purpose amongst EU 
states. This was most graphically demonstrated in the EU's muddled 
response to the Yugoslavia crisis, but the evidence of increasing internal 
disunity has been noticeable in a variety of other policy areaS. 
The implications of the Maastricht Treaty for the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe seeking membership are twofold. First, as candidates 
applying for admission after Maastricht, the conditions and requirements 
for membership are more stringent and complex than for countries which 
joined earlier. The post-Maastricht acquis cOl1ll1lllllitaire, the so-called 
patrimony of the Union, represents a daunting set of conditions which 
involves a considerable erosion of national sovereignty. It cannot be 
excluded that, like Norway, some of the governments of Central and 
Europe might balk at the implications for their relative loss of sovereign 
powers." But, the second and more significant implication is that the 
Central and Eastern Europeans' applications are likely to remain on "hold" 
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until the internal EU debate of the relationship between "deepening" and 
"widening" has been resolved. Alain Juppe. the French Foreign Minister, 
highlighted this when he commented in January 1995 that eastward en-
largement would no longer be on the agenda if the 1996-97 IGC on the 
realisation of the Maastricht Treaty were to fail to lead to a consolidation of 
the EU." Juppe was, in essence, making clear that eastward enlargement 
would be made strictly subordinate to the demands of Economic and 
Monetary Union. 
Given that EMU, and the various other dimensions of the Maastricht 
Treaty, continue to be highly controversial, the splits and divisions within 
the EU are likely to make any satisfactory compromises difficult to obtain. 
At worst, this could lead to institutional paralysis and the inability to 
accommodate the demands of Central and Eastern Europe. At best, it will 
mean a period of some delay before new members from Central and 
Eastern Europe would be fully incorporated, with the ambitious timetable 
of around the year 2000 almost certainly being missed. 
The evidence for these internal constraints against fast eastward 
enlargement will be addressed in the rest of this section. First, though. it is 
necessary to outline the moves that the EU has already made to address the 
needs and demands of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Progress on !Ell enlargement 
Europe Agreements. The first major response of the EU to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War was the signing 
of Association Agreements (Europe Agreements in accordance with Art. 
238 EEC-Treaty) in 1992 and 1993 with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania and Bulgaria, which were operated on an interim basis pending 
ratification in 1994. The Baltic countries and Slovenia have now either 
signed similar Europe Agreements or are in the process of negotiations for 
such agreements. 
The Agreements formulated the goal of setting up a free trade area for 
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industrial goods within a time-frame of ten years. This intention, however, 
was graduated according to commodity groups and within groups, accord-
ing to the principle of asymmetry, meaning that the EU liberalises earlier 
than the partner countries. These agreements, however, were signed 
during a period of recession within the EU and were consequently far from 
generous. In the annexes to the agreements for each country, a hust of 
exceptions were specifically laid out and contingent protection of EU 
markets were permitted through anti-dumping actions and safeguard 
measures (usually quotas) where imports were loosely defined as causing 
"serious injury to domestic producers and bringing about serious deteriora-
tion in the economic situation of the region". Even more damagingly, the 
very areas where the Central and Eastern European economies had a 
competitive advantage - in agricultural products, textiles, clothing, coal and 
steel products - the EU categorised as "sensitive areas" which were subject 
to especially restrictive regulations. 
These restrictions in trade for ;'sensitive goods" have been the source 
of considerable frustration in Central and Eastern Europe. It also meant that 
initially the Europe Agreements had only modest trade creation effects. 
This is changing, though, as liberalisation increasingly comes into force, 
with free trade in the industrial sector being realised in 1998. Trade in 
agricultural products remains, though, highly restricted. The negative 
impact of this has been that the trade balance on agricultural products has 
moved increasingly in favour of the EU from a deficit in 1992 to a growing 
surplus. 
The overall impact of the Europe Agreements is, therefore, in some 
dispute. But, however the costs and benefits are assessed, the reality is that 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have had a remarkable success 
in re-orientating the vast majority of their trade with the EU. In addition, 
their economies are growing faster than the EU's, and once the full effects 
of trade liberalisation are felt, it is estimated that exports from the East 
could increase from as much as 10-16% per annum." 
Copenhagen Summit in June 1993. The European Council in Copenha-
gen was the next most important development. The Europe Agreements 
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had only mentioned the question of accession in the preambles to the 
agreements. At Copenhagen, a slightly more concrete resolution was 
agreed, which stated that "the associated countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union". The 
conditions of membership included a democratic order based on the rule of 
law with guarantees for human rights and protection of minorities; a 
market economy which is sustainable in competition; and the declaration of 
support for the political, economic and monetary union, including the 
willingness to adopt in its entirety the acquis of the community. These 
conditions were relatively unexceptional. However, what was distinctively 
new was the addition of a further criterion that accession would also be 
determined "by the ability of the EU to integrate new members". This 
condition has clear parallels with the conditions for membership outlined in 
the NA TO Enlargement Study. 
Essen Summit ill December J 994. At the European Council in Essen in 
1994, a structured pre-accession strategy was laid out for the ten associ-
ated states, involving the phased adoption by the applicant countries of the 
acquis collllllullitaire. It was also agreed that there would be regular, at 
least annual, meetings among heads of governments, as well as among 
numerous other ministers of foreign affairs, finance, economic, agricul-
ture, transport, justice and home affairs. It was even agreed that the 
Europe Agreement countries should participate in foreign and security 
policies as well as .interior and legal policies. Mirroring the NA TO's Part-
nership for Peace, this could be called the EU's Partnership for Prosperity. 
However, these agreements were not reached without opposition. Plans 
to turn the bilateral free trade agreements into a single free trade area in the 
industrial field failed to be approved. France, with the support of the 
southern Mediterranean countries, also ensured that the 1. I bn ECUs 
provided to the associated states up to 1999, would be matched by more 
funds for the Mediterranean, specifically North Africa. In general, the 
southern EU couniries were far more lukewarm over eastward enlargement 
than the northern countries, particularly Germany. 
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The constraints against EU enlargement 
On the surface, the present status of negotiations of the EU towards 
eastward enlargement is not dissimilar to that of NATO. Like NATO, the 
EU is engaged in individualised dialogues with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe over the sleps required for achieving the necessary pre-
conditions for accession. The EU has forged a set of institutional arrange-
ments and joint actions which have a parallel with NATO's Partnership for 
Peace. The EU, like NATO, has also produced a pre-accession strategy at 
the Essen Summit which identifies the "why" and "how" of enlargement, 
not unlike the 1995 NA TO Enlargement Study. Also, like NATO, the EU 
has so far resisted making explicit "when" and "who" will be the first 
candidates to become new members. Although the EU has gone further 
than NATO in specifying 10 potential candidates, there remains the same 
basic problem of which of those countries would actually be selected for 
initial admission. 
The EU Timetable. However, the EU is in reality rar less prepared than 
NATO to make the critical decisions over eastward enlargement. Part of 
the problem is, as stated above, the necessity for the EU to address a 
number of other items on its agenda. These are partly derived from the 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty and partly trom the steps required 
to reform the EU's institutions and practices to make it capable offunc-
tioning efficiently with an enlarged membership. The first hurdle is the 
successful conclusion of the [GC which will hopefully conclude in 1997 
alter the British elections and with ratitication taking place in 1998. In 
1998, however, decisions will have to be made over moving towards 
Economic and Monetary union. A new budget package by 2000 would 
then put forward a new deal between net contributors and beneficiaries, 
taking account of the needs of the East. As one French diplomat has 
stated, "it is only then that we can begin serious enlargement negotia-
tions".:!) 
Yet if the time taken for the accession negotiations with Spain and 
Portugal is a guide, there would be a delay of several years. It could be 
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2005 at the earliest before Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovenia could join. But, this timetable is itself dependent on there being no 
major delays or problems in the attainment of the earlier agreements. This 
is, in no sense, assured. First, there is the question whether the IGC can 
overcome opposition, notably from Britain, to improvements to the func-
tioning of the union through measures such as extended qualified majority 
voting. Second, uncertainty over the planned monetary union could lead to 
a delay of EMU, and the resulting crisis of confidence would make it 
difficult for the EU to respond with accession talks to the East. Third, the 
negotiations over a new budgetary deal is bound to be a difficult process, 
particularly as it seeks to address the financial implications of the accession 
of the relatively poorer central and Eastern European states. 
The obstacles against eastward enlargement only become more appar-
ent when the potential impact on the EU is analysed in greater detail. The 
most common of these obstacles against EU enlargement include: 
Threat q( Increased Competition. Some sense of this can be seen in the 
fear amongst many in the EU that speedy entry of Central and Eastern 
Europe would lead to tougher cut-price competition with the loss of 
livelihoods and jobs inside the EU as well as massive movements of labour 
from the East to the West. In more subtle versions, emphasis is placed on 
the economic and social costs and the excessive strain on reform countries 
in the event of an overhasty integration into the single market. 
Such arguments, however, run contrary to both theoretical knowledge, 
especially the theory of comparative costs, and to empirical evidence. The 
very fact that the central and Eastern European countries have achieved 
considerable successes in trade with the West, despite the trade restrictions 
on sensitive goods, is an argument for swift external integration. Analo-
gously, it would be flawed to argue that the prosperity and the economic 
development of the East, which is the most important factor in reducing 
the migration of labour, would be promoted through barriers to the Single 
Market. Rather, it is free trade with unimpeded access to the EU market 
which provides the best guarantee for the speedy and successful transfor-
mation of the reform countries into stable democracies and market econo-
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mies. Nevertheless, despite the cogency of these arguments for the mutual 
benefits to be gained through increased economic incorporation, the 
political reality is of considerable fear and resistance of the perceived 
implications. 
Financial Strains. These reservations against speedy entry for Central 
and Eastern European countries come predominantly from those countries 
which have a low level of pay and relatively large shares ofthe agricultural 
products, raw materials and light industry in exports. However, the fact 
that these countries are also net recipients of EU budget payments indicates 
the real source of their concern - with the financial implications rather than 
the impact of increased competition. On a rough estimate, in 1992 the 
peripheral countries of the EU (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal) 
received 15 times more per capita aid than the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean reform countries. If analogous assistance were to be provided to 
these latter countries, it would result in approximately a two-fold increase 
in the current structural fund expenditures. The countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe would also be entitled to money from the Cohesion Fund. 
In addition, the large and relatively poor agricultural sectors of these 
countries would, on present procedures, lead to the substantial transfer of 
the common agricultural policy funds. One discussion paper in the com-
mission reportedly estimated that, in the event of accession by the reform 
countries, the annual agricultural and structural policy payments would be 
at almost 70 billion ECU." 
However, according to existing rules, any increase of community 
expenditures is only possible if it is "prosperity neutral", meaning that it 
keeps pace with the development of the national economies in member 
states. In addition, a ceiling for the expansion of the community budget has 
been fixed at 1.27% of EU gross domestic product. Net payers are, 
therefore, highly unlikely to finance additional expenditures; the only 
alternative is through the redistribution of the agricultural, structural and 
social policy transfers to the detriment ofthe previous net beneficiary 
countries. The latter, however, see their appropriations as a legitimate 
entitlement and promised in treaty form. I f these financial transfers were to 
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be threatened, they would probably refuse to back any accession by the 
Central and Eastern European countries. In general, this financial issue is 
likely to be a major obstacle to eastward enlargement which will become 
increasingly apparent as the budgetary negotiations, which have to be 
concluded by 2000. are initiated after the 1996-97 IGC. 
Agriculture. The ramifications of eastward enlargement go further, 
though, than the prospective financial strains. The EU agricultural commis-
sioner, Franz Fischler, is acutely aware of the potential impact of the 
accession of the Central and Eastern European countries to the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Reforms of the CAP will necessarily be re-
quired, with all their associated sensitive political implications, ifFischler 
can successfully ensure that the "goal of enlargement must not reside in 
killing off the CAP"." 
Jl1stitllliol1ai Strains. The institutional consequences of eastward 
enlargement are also substantial. Under present rules for the European 
Council, the accession of the Visegrad countries would represent a further 
shift in favour of the smaller countries at the expense of the large coun-
tries. It would also make the Council an increasingly unwieldy body. If 
every Council member were to be granted 20 minutes speaking time this 
would extend the minimum duration of a meeting to six hours. Under 
present arrangements, the European Parliament would also increase its 
numbers to 756 if Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics and Hungary 
were to join. It is difficult to imagine that a parliament orthis size, with a 
host of languages and the absence of European parties, would be capable 
of expressing a common will and purpose. 
Future steps for IEU enlargement 
All these institutional and structural obstacles against eastward enlargement 
indicate the seriousness of the crisis facing the EU over this issue. The 
core problem is that the previous strategies for managing the expansion of 
the Union are inadequate for meeting the challenges of such enlargement. 
In the past, there were two principal "strategies of evasion". First, there 
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was the strategy of fostering consensus through financial transfers, most 
strikingly through the creation of new assistance funds in the fields of 
structural, regional and cohesion policy. Second, there was the strategy of 
seeking consensus through the increased application of qualified majority 
decisions. 
Neither of these strategies are adequate for resolving the institutional 
and structural problems posed by eastward enlargement. The application of 
existing agricultural, structural and regional policies to the economically 
weaker countries of Central and Eastern Europe would increase commu-
nity expenditures to a politically unacceptable level. It would also make 
previous net beneficiaries, as well as net paying countries, resistant to the 
speedy accession of reform states. 
Eastward enlargement would also endanger the strategy of gaining 
consensus through majority voting. Majority decisions are generally only 
accepted where a community consensus can be formed which embraces 
both majorities and minorities, and where the outvoted minorities do not 
view the majority decisions as extraneous decisions. Such a consensus 
requires a sense of common identity and purpose, which is traditionally 
only to be found within nation states. In the post-Cold War era, and with a 
Europe embracing its western, central and eastern parts, it is highly un-
likely that such a consensus can be formed. It is this critical dilemma 
which the IGC is attempting to resolve and is unlikely ultimately to reach to 
a fully satisfactory compromise. The essential problem is that the IGC is 
seeking to extend the process of integration and joint decision-making at 
precisely the time that the national interests of the EU states are becoming 
increasingly heterogeneous. The accession of the Central and Eastern 
European countries would only accentuate this fragmentation of interests in 
the European context. 
The reality is, therefore, that the issue of eastward enlargement presents 
a profound challenge to the existing institutions and practices of the EU 
which are not going to be easy to resolve. Paradoxically, the EU is finding 
it even more difficult to adapt to the end of the Cold War than NATO. 
Although NATO appeared ineffective and paralysed during much of the 
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Yugoslav crisis, it has managed to re-assert its identity and purpose with 
surprising rapidity. The Day ton accords in late 1995 was the most signifi-
cant catalyst for this reinvigoration of NA TO. The burgeoning France-
NATO rapprochement has, despite continuing lower level conflicts such as 
control of NATO Command South, provided further confirmation of the 
increased vitality of the Atlantic Alliance. For NA TO, the major problem 
over eastward enlargement is less the internal implications, though these 
are important, but the potential external consequences, particularly with 
regard to Russia's reaction. 
Thus, NATO is currently in a position to make the critical decisions and 
choices over enlargement and it is highly probable that the July 1997 
Madrid Summit will make substantive and dramatic moves in this regard. 
The EU, in contrast, is not nearly as prepared to make such decisions. 
Numerous institutional and structural reforms have to be addressed first 
before any decision on eastward enlargement can be considered. It will 
almost certainly be the case that any EU decisions wiII be made in the 
context of choices and decisions already articulated by NATO. The British 
EU commissioner, Neil Kinnock, might have broken ranks with the rest of 
the commission in stating that EU enlargement will only take place in 10-15 
years time (i.e from 2005-2010) but he was expressing an increasingly 
commonly held view. 
This is not to say that the issue of EU is less significant than NATO 
enlargement or wiII cease to be an important item on the EU's agenda. The 
future prosperity and democratic stability of Central and Eastern Europe, 
its security in the wider sense, is critically dependent on the region's 
access to the markets of the West and ultimately through its incorporation 
into the EU's single market. It can also be plausibly argued that, even if the 
process towards monetary union and institutional reform were to be 
delayed and encounter substantive obstacles, the drive towards eastward 
enlargement might become even more urgent. The European pro}et, like 
any ideological construct, deplores a vacuum. Enlargement to the East, 
driven by Germany's concerns and anxieties, might replace the western 
integrationist dynamic as the principal self-justifYing ambition for the EU. 
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However, even if this were to be the case, it would most probably follow 
decisions made by NATO. 
When decisions on eastward enlargement do take place, it is also likely 
that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would not be offered full 
and immediate membership. Some variation of a phased or partial member-
ship would probably be considered. But even such relatively cautious 
moves would not be without problems. Within the EU, there is a growing 
debate over the implications of a "multi-speed" or "variable geometry" 
Europe, with "core~' and "periphery" countries grouped around certain 
functional areas. The problem is that the formation of an internally differ-
entiated European Union represents a significant departure from previous 
practice and tradition. As a result, there is strong resistance to seeing such 
arrangements formally institutionalised, even if they do become a de/aCID 
reality in areas such as monetary union. 
Nevertheless, ideas associated with this debate have been promoted as 
potential avenues for bringing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
more rapidly into EU institutions. One suggestion has been that these 
countries could be offered immediate or speedy membership of the two 
intergovernmental pillars of the EU - the common and foreign security 
policy and the co-operation on justice and home affairs. In particular, it has 
been suggested that membership of CFSP could respond to the Central and 
Eastern Europeans security concerns. This, in turn, leads to the suggestion 
that what would really provide genuine security reassurance would be 
membership of the Western European Union. 
WEU enlargement 
Throughout its existence, the Western European Union has been a shad-
owy organisation whose potential as an independent European defence and 
security organisation has consistently failed to materialise. Until 1984, the 
WEU had been almost completely subsumed by NATO. In that year, 
principally as a response to President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, 
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there was an attempt to resurrect and "make better use of the WEU 
framework", Advances were made and the WEU has played an active, if 
rather limited, role in upholding the maritime embargoes during the Iran-
Iraq war, the Gulf War in 1990-1 and the Yugoslav crisis. 
The end of the Cold War considerably boosted expectations for the 
WEU to take on a more active and substantial role. The Maasticht Treaty 
fed these expectations by laying the foundations for a common foreign and 
security policy which would "include the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy" with a central role played by the WEU. In Petersberg in 
1992, the WEU Council of Ministers also set out an ambitious programme 
for strengthening the WEU's operational role through member states 
providing military units, under WEU authority, which could be employed 
for peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue, and peacemaking tasks. A 
WEU planning cell was established to plan and co-ordinate any such WEU 
operations. The decision by NATO that a WEU-directed CJTF would be 
permitted to use NA TO assets has also given the potential for the WEU to 
have a more operationally independent capability. 
The WEU has also been engaged in concrete steps to extend its activi-
ties to the countries of East and Central Europe. WEU enlargement has 
been almost a mirror image ofNA TO enlargement. After the formation of 
NACC in 1991, the WEU established a Forum of Consultation with the 
states of Central and Eastern Europe. After the creation of the Partnership 
for Peace programme in January 1994, the WEU admitted nine Central and 
Eastern European states as associate members (Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, Romania, Bulgaria and the three Baltic states). 
Like PFP, the associate memberships allow these states to take part in 
discussions, participate in military excrcises and contribute to WEU opera-
tions. However, associate status does not provide security guarantees or 
promises of full membership. 
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Future prospects for WIEU enlargement 
Although the issue of NATO enlargement has tended to dominate discus-
sion and the policy agenda, there are a number of influential advocates of 
the advantages ofWEU enlargement as an alternative to NATO enlarge-
ment.26 In particular, sllch advocates argue that~ in contrast to NATO, the 
WEU is a collective defence organisation which does not inherit the Cold 
War associations of NA TO, most notably its anti-Soviet legacy. As a 
result, Russia has been relatively unconcerned over the prospects of WEU 
enlargement and has not articulated the extreme opposition as in its reaction 
to NA TO expansion. 
An additional dimension behind the seeming attractiveness ofWEU 
enlargement rests on the fact that the WEU is a distinctively European 
institution. Although the WEU is required to co-operate closely with NATO 
and is institutionally separate from the EU, it is nevertheless closely tied to 
the Union. At the Maastricht Treaty the WEU was defined as the "defence 
component of the European Union" with the task to "elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions of the union which have a defence implication". 
The WEU, therefore, is strongly supported by those countries, such as 
France, which seek to promote a European Security and Defence Identity 
(ESDI) which would work closely with the Atlantic Alliance but could also 
act, if required, independently from NATO. In the wider context of Euro-
pean construction, WEU enlargement to the East would represent a con-
crete step for Europe and the EU taking responsibility for the region's 
security and defence requirements. And, again, such WEU enlargement has 
the intrinsic advantage that, like EU enlargement, it is viewed favourably in 
Moscow. 
However, there are a number of countervailing constraints against the 
prospect of WEU enlargement as an alternative to NATO enlargement. The 
first major set of obstacles is quite simply that it does not respond to the 
demands of the Central and Eastern Europeans. Their objective is NA TO 
membership since NATO provides the security guarantees that they 
perceive to be credible and effective. The WEU is perceived in a rar more 
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ambiguous manner. 
It must be admitted that this is a fairly reasonable assessment on the 
part of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Although article 5 of 
the Brussels Treaty, which underpins the WEU, does provide for collective 
defence which "affords the party attacked all the milital)' and other aid and 
assistance in their power'" this provision has effectively remained an 
exercise in rhetoric. In the context of the post-Cold War era, where there 
is no immediate and easily definable threat, its function is even more 
questionable than the less binding collective defence provisions of article 5 
of the North Atlantic Treaty. The fact that the WEU, in contrast to NATO, 
does not have the operational capabilities to offer effective collective 
defence, only adds to its institutional deficiencies as a collective defence 
organisation. It should also be remembered that the Brussels Treaty is up 
for review in 1998 and article 5 could be revised to take into account the 
existing realities. 
The 1992 Petersberg declaration, with its emphasis on humanitarian, 
rescue and peacekeeping tasks, indicates the orientation of the WEU 
towards security rather than defence missions. Many of the ideas behind 
WEU enlargement also focus more on the security rather than defence 
dimension. The December 1995 WEU Parliamental)' Assembly debated the 
issue of granting Central and Eastern European countries "soft security 
guarantees" by inviting them to become full WEU members without 
collective defence guarantees, while at the same time offering them mem-
bership of the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs pillars of the EU." But, 
it is difficult to see how this would satisfy Central and Eastern European 
demands, since the WEU package would provide them with neither the 
economic benefits of the EU nor the hard security guarantees offered by 
NATO. 
It would also be a mistake to see Russian tolerance of WEU enlarge-
ment as an argument in its favour. Russian leaders and analysts are hard-
nosed realists in their political judgements and assess external threats in 
tenns of milital)' capabilities. NATO is considered a threat since it has 
effective military capabilities. The WEU is not considered a threat because 
62 DEFENCE SluDlES 1/1997 
it lacks such capabilities. If this were to change, Russian attitudes would 
also change. The underlying tension with Russia can be seen in the Russian 
Foreign Minister's response to the WEU offering associate membership to 
Central and Eastern Europe. Kozyrev welcomed "constructive dialogue and 
practical co-operation with the WEU" but warned that this would be 
conditional on WEU expansion not being in "contradiction with the need to 
establish a truly pan-European system of security and co-operation"." 
The second set of factors which militate against WEU enlargement is 
that the trend has been towards an increasing marginalisation of the WEU, 
as NATO has assumed a more dominant position in European security and 
defence matters. This trend was confirmed during the Yugoslav war as 
NA TO emerged as the only effective and credible body to provide a 
resolution of the crisis. The contrast with the WEU's ineffective and 
marginal role was starkly demonstrated. The crisis also showed that the 
greatest threat to European security was not the imposition of US 
hegemonic power but rather the threat of US disengagement and with-
drawal from Europe. The French agreement in late 1995 to participate fully 
in NATO's Military Committee was the most striking evidence of this 
change in perception, and has resulted in France's decreased enthusiasm 
for promoting the WEU as an alternative to NA TO. 
It has also been noticeable that NA TO has become increasingly 
europeanised in the post-Cold War era, thus undermining much of the 
underlying logic of the WEU. One striking indication of this can be seen in 
the June 1995 British and French initiative, announced in Paris rather than 
Brussels, to establish a NATO Rapid Reaction Force in response to Bosnian 
Serb hostage taking in the former Yugoslavia. More generally, it is now 
almost inconceivable to imagine that the WEU would find the necessary 
will to engage in military operations if NATO itselfwas incapable of acting. 
The agreement to permit a WEU-Ied CJTF is, in the end, a sop to the 
European enthusiasm for the rhetoric, rather than the implementation of, 
defence and security europeanisation and thus does not represent a genuine 
threat to the primacy of NATO. 
This impacts directly upon the question of WEU enlargement. The 
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danger is that, if the WEU were to enlarge eastward without a similar 
NATO move, it could have the same consequences as European attempts 
unilaterally to deal with Yugoslavia. The Europeans would be in danger of 
making promises that they then would not be capable of fulfilling. It is 
difficult to imagine that the United Slates would be so tolerant of a second 
demonstration of European impotence and loss of collective will. It is for 
this reason that the United Slates in 1995 gave such firm warnings that 
Finland should not join the WEU, which is its legal right as an EU member. 
The fact that it was the US, rather than the EU countries, which made this 
clear indicates a certain irresponsibility on the side of the EU states. The 
United States is determined that no security guarantees should be provided 
by the "back door" without NATO first agreeing to them. The EU has 
moved towards accepting that this needs to be defined clearly as a part of 
its policy. 
The third set of constraints against WEU enlargement relates to its 
unsatisfactory internal constitution. Membership of the WEU includes an 
unfortunate four-tiered structure, which refiects the WEU's asymmetry 
both with the EU and NATO. The first tier includes the ten full members of 
the WEU. But, there is a second "observer" category for Austria, Den-
mark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, who are EU members but have not 
been willing fully to join the WEU. There is also an "associate membership" 
of non-EU European NATO members, which includes Iceland, Norway 
and Turkey. The final "associate partners" category include the nine 
Central and Eastern European countries. Despite all these attempts to be as 
inclusive as possible, there are continuing anomalies in the WEU's mem-
bership. Finland, which is an EU member, has no status in the WEU and 
Denmark, which is both a full EU and NATO member, has only the loosest 
of associations with the WEU. 
The problem with this institutional confusion is that the WEU ends up 
as a poor decision-making body. The fact that not all EU members are 
willing to accept the responsibilities for collective defence is a weak link in 
the arguments for the incorporation of the WEU into the EU. For this 
reason, it is probable that British resistance to such incorporation will carry 
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the day at the 1996-97 IGC. 
But, this rellects the wider issue that defence is a serious matter, which 
requires a clear commitment of all members of a defence community to 
fulfil their obligations. The current members of the WEU do not provide 
this linkage. It is difficult to imagine the WEU being capable of making 
decisions over controversial security or defence issues which NATO is not 
far better placed to address. NATO has the structural advantage of an 
integrated military structure and a hegemonic power, the United States, 
whose views have a determining inlluence over NA TO decision-making. 
Why the WEU is not the solution to eastward enlargement 
In conel usion, ~lerefore, the promotion of WEU enlargement to Central 
and Eastern Europe cannot provide a satisfactory solution to the security 
demands of Central and Eastern Europe. First, in terms of its membership 
structure and its operational capabilities, the WEU is not in a position to 
provide any meaningful security guarantees to the East. The WEU needs to 
engage in further institutional reforms and, more critically, WEU member 
states will need to provide far more resources to build up a strategic 
command system, a heavy lift capacity and other key military resources 
which are currently dependent on the United States. Second. the issue of 
WEU enlargement unnecessarily complicates the drive for EU enlargement. 
By bringing in security and defence issues, the WEU could potentially delay 
EU expansion and distract the EU from its most important mission which is 
to provide the economic and political pre-conditions for stabilising the post-
communist East. 
Finally, the WEU adds confusion to the issue ofNA TO enlargement. 
The possibility that countries might join the WEU before NA TO potentially 
aggravates relations with the United States, by presenting the prospect of 
"back door" security guarantees which the US has not independently 
sanctioned. In addition, forcefUlly promoting WEU enlargement potentially 
provides the ammunition that many domestic forces in the US seek for 
DEfENCE STUfJlFS VEnT 65 
promoting increased disengagement from European security affairs. After 
the developments in the former Yugoslavia, even the most ardent Euro-
enthusiasts should be cautious about projecting a European defence identity 
which can operationally rival the existing capabilities ofNA TO. For this 
reason alone, the WEU is unlikely to be actively promoted as a genuine 
alternative for NATO to provide the security guarantees which the coun-
tries of East and Central Europe are seeking. 
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Chapter 3: The challenge of eastward 
enlargement a country responses 
Although institutions like NA TO, the EU and the WEU do attain a certain 
independence and internal dynamic of their own, it is ultimately the mem-
ber states of these institutions which determine policy and make the critical 
decisions. In this sense, institutions are at the service of their member 
states, particularly the most powerful of these states, and not the other 
way round. This is even more the case with decisions like eastward 
enlargement which are politically highly sensitive and have significant 
strategic and geo-political impl ications. Thus, how the various nation-states 
define their national interests with regard to this issue is critical for under-
standing the probable future evolution of the process of eastward enlarge-
ment. 
This chapter will, therefore, focus on the ways in which the individual 
states affected by the issue of eastward enlargement are defining their 
specific national interests towards this issue and the difficult choices it 
presents. First, this will involve an assessment of the positions of the most 
important of the existing member states of NATO and the EU who will be 
required to make the eventual decisions either to accept or to reject new 
members. Second, the position of Russia, whose opposition ID NATO 
enlargement represents a major obstacle to the success of the policy, will 
be analysed, with particular attention given to its possible reactions to any 
NATO expansion. Third, there will be an assessment of the candidate 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, indicating those countries most 
likely to be adopted as new members, and the potential dilemmas and 
difficulties this would pose to those countries whose requests for member-
ship will probably, in the first instance, been denied. 
The previous chapter argued that NATO is far more advanced than the 
EU to make the critical decisions over eastward enlargement. Whilsl NATO 
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will almost certainly be inviting new members to start the negotiations for 
accession in Summer 1997, the EU will probablY delay confronting these 
difficult choices until the new millennium. For this reason, the balance of 
this chapter will be focused more on the issue of NATO rather than EU 
enlargement. 
The United States and the Western European states 
The Franco-German alliance is often described, not least by enthusiast 
German federalists, as the "motor" of European integration. In a similar 
way, it has become increasingly evident that the US-German alliance 
provides the underlying momentum for NATO enlargement to the East. 
Thus, in bOUl the NATO and EU enlargement processes, Germany occu-
pies a central role. It is, thus, important to examine Germany's stance 
towards the dual enlargement process which will be of such critical 
importance to its future development. 
Germany 
In the context of the post-Cold War debates over the EU and NATO, 
Germany adopts what might be called the "institutional maximalist" posi-
tion. As is well known, the German government is deeply committed to the 
integrationist agenda for the EU, seeking to promote a federal Europe 
which has increased supranational powers. It is strongly in favour of 
monetary union, of the extension of qualified majority voting to areas such 
as justice, security and defence, and the expansion of the powers of the 
European parliament. At the same time, Germany has been the strongest 
advocate for promoting the "widening" of the union to take on new mem-
bers from Central Europe. It has also been in the forefront of the drive 
towards NATO enlargement and, as was noted in the previous chapter, it 
was Yolker RUhe, the German Defence Minister, which first placed this 
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issue onto NATO's agenda in Spring 1993. 
The German government has also made clear that it does not consider 
these various objectives to be in conflict with one another. It argues that 
EU enlargement to the East does not weaken the drive towards a more 
integrated Union, as Britain hopes and France fears, but rather that a 
"deepening" of the union is a pre-condition for a sllccessful "widening" of 
the union. Similarly, whilst Germany recognises that NA TO and the EU are 
not presently congruent and will not embrace the East simultaneously, it 
argues that, in a rather unfortunate phrasing, a "final congruence" can be 
reached, whereby the European members of NA TO corresponds more or 
less to the EU.1O 
The critical question is why has Germany developed this "institutional 
maximalist'· position? The roots of this position lie in the two persistent 
patterns in Gennany's foreign policy since World War 11: idealism and the 
pursuit of balallce. The idealist strain derives from Germany's reaction to 
its own aggressive, nationalist past and the perceived success of the 
process of inter-state co-operation and integration, which has been most 
visibly symbolised by the Franco-German relationship. There is a strong 
conviction in Germany that the model of Franco-German co-operation 
should be extended to the rest of Europe to promote a pan-European peace, 
based on dialogue and common structures, which can make a decisive 
break with the continent's legacy of war and conflict. It is this idealism 
which suffuses Germany's stance towards the European Union. Amongst 
most German elites, there is a passionate belief that deeper European 
integration corresponds to German national interests and is the best means 
to guarantee peace and security on the European continent. 
However, the idealist strain in German foreign policy has also been 
complemented by the persistent pursuit of balance, traditionally along the 
East-West axis. This balance has, though, meant different things to ditfer-
ent German leaders. For the Federal Republic's first Chancellor, Konrad 
Adenauer, balance meant joining the Western Alliance and the United 
States, so as to re-build Germany without threatening its neighbours. For 
Willy Brandt, balance was re-defined as OSlpolilik which involved the 
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development of working relationships not only with East Germany but also 
with the other Warsaw Pact countries including the Soviet Union. This 
policy, involving a constant German balance between its interests in the 
West and the East, became the defining feature of Foreign Minister 
Genscher's long period of office during the 1970s and 1980s. 
In the reunified Germany under Chancellur Kohl, the policy of 
OSlpolilik has assumed a new and more urgent mission. It has been re-
defined as a Gennan resolve to ensure that the old Cold War East-West 
division is dissolved and that there is no re-emergence of the old dynamics 
and rivalries that have historically been the sources of conflict in Central 
Europe. There is a clear consensus that Germany's eastern borders cannot 
remain the eastern edge of either the EU and NATO and that these Western 
institutions are the vehicles for projecting democracy and stability and for 
preventing the emergence of instability on the eastern border destabilising 
Germany itself. Thus, Gennany's ardent advocacy of NATO and EU 
enlargement is driven by this new definition of the logic of balance, of a 
new German OSlpolilik promoted through NATO and the EU. 
However, what distinguishes this new Oslpolilik from its earlier version 
is that, in the post-Cold war period, Germany is a more influential and 
central actor in European politics. In geo-political terms, Germany has been 
the principal beneficiary of the end of the Cold War. A re-unified Germany 
within a re-unified Europe is a Germany which has regained its central geo-
strategic position in Europe. In a world where power is defined more in 
economic than military tenns, and with a weak and introspective Russia, 
the reunified Germany is clearly the dominant European power. The end of 
the Cold War also coincides, and in some senses legitimises, Germany's 
coming to terms with its past and its re-assertion as a "normal" power 
willing to promote its specific national priorities and objectives. 
However, this is not to say that Germany is wanting to break free from 
its Western European institutional ties. Rather, Germany is determined to 
see those institutional ties spreading eastward precisely so that Gennany 
does not have to d,eal with Central Europe on its own. German strategy is 
to initiate policy, keep the issue of eastward enlargement firmly on the 
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agenda, but also to ensure that it secures allies for its objectives so that the 
final decisions represent a common NATO and EU policy. It is for this 
reason that Germany places so much significance on its relations with the 
US and France, since these are the powers whose assent is critical for, 
respectively, NATO and EU enlargement. 
But, as with earlier periods in OSlpolilik, Germany has also been very 
active in including Russia in dialogue and discussion over NA TO plans, 
most particularly as regards the process of NATO enlargement, and in 
seeking to find proposals and ideas which might relieve Russian security 
fears. In this way, Germany has sought to become the mediator between 
Russia and the United States over their competing visions for the future of 
European security. 
However, Gennany's balancing between East and West has its limits. If 
it came to the crunch, Gennany's post-Cold War priorities lie more in 
promoting stability in the East than deepening integration in the West. The 
fact that Germany is becoming the dominant trading partner for Central 
Europe; that Germany's economic interests and its future competitiveness 
lie in developing trade and investment in Central and Eastern Europe; and 
that Gennany cannot hope to remain disengaged or unaffected from 
instabilities arising to its East - all these factors promote a growing German 
orientation to the East. Historical memories, both of German guilt and 
Central European instability, have also impelled Chancellor Kohl to make 
highly personal commitments in favour ofEU and NATO enlargement to 
Central Europe. Poland, in particular, is a key German priority which was 
reflected in Kohl explicitly promising that Bonn would push for Polish 
membership of these institutions by the year 2000.30 Having made such 
promises, though, has only accentuated the need for Germany to gain 
support from its NATO and EU colleagues for such a fast-track process of 
enlargement. 
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The United States 
The Clinton administration has been the strongest ally of Germany On the 
issue of NATO enlargement to the East. Once Yolker ROhe set this issue 
onto NATO's agenda in early 1993, Germany was relieved that the US 
decided to assert its leadership and set about defining how this process of 
enlargement should be promoted. The PFP proposals unveiled in early 1994 
were inspired and drawn up by the US, and the September 1995 NATO 
Enlargement Study was similarly marked by its origins in the Washington. 
Clinton's appointment of Mad elei ne Albright - a vocal and committed 
advocate of NATO enlargement - to replace Warren Christopher as Secre-
tary of State for his second term also indicates that the president is deter-
mined to take the lead on the issue of European security in 1997 and 
beyond. 
Although the United States has come close to adopting the German 
position on NATO enlargement, it has arrived at this position for markedly 
ditTerent strategic and geo-political reasons. Whilst Germany has been 
forced to become increasingly engaged in European affairs since the end of 
the Cold War, the United States has been moving in the opposite direction 
towards growing disengagement. There are multiple factors behind this. 
Clearly, the end of the Cold War has been a significant element for weak-
ening the glue of the transatlantic alliance, which lVas most clearly demon-
strated during the Yugoslav crisis. But, the advent of the Clinton presi-
dency, the first US leader not bound by the memory of World War 11, and 
an administration which was determined to focus attention on domestic 
rather than international affairs, added to the momentum for US disengage-
ment from Europe. The administration's resolve to pay greater attention to 
its international ecpnomic relations alsp aggravated relations since Wash-
ington has increasingly perceived the EU as more of a protectionist threat 
than an ally. A shift from Europe to Asia Pacific has also been noticeable in 
US foreign policy as the latter region increasingly appears the more dy-
namic trading partner." 
All these factors have undoubtedly changed US perceptions of its future 
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role and degree of engagement in Europe. However, it would be a mistake 
to think that these pressures have irreparably damaged the strong cultural, 
historical and institutional ties which have traditionally bound the United 
States in a far closer embrace with Europe than with any other region of 
the world. The United States remains committed to NA TO as the institu-
tional forum for transatlantic relations and for providing the integrated 
multinational forces which have become even more vital in the post-Cold 
War environment, as demonstrated in the Gulf War and the Yugoslav 
conflict. 
However, commitment to NATO does not, in itself, translate into a 
commitment to see NATO take on new members from Central and Eastern 
Europe. Indeed, there have been powerful constituencies in Washington 
which initially tried to resist NA TO enlargement. The Pentagon was 
concerned tilat such enlargement might weaken the operational capabilities 
of NA TO. The State Department, particularly those sections dealing with 
Russia, were also initially opposed, since NA TO expansion was considered 
to be provocative to Russia and which could undermine Yeltsin's liberalis-
ing, pro-Western orientation. 
The US-European dispute over Bosnia during 1993 appears to have 
provided the first impulse towards a change of policy over eastward 
enlargement. The evidence ofNA TO disarray and disunity provided 
ammunition to those in Washington who sought NATO to re-define its 
mission, with enlargement as a necessary step if NATO were not to be 
reduced into insignificance. The December 1993 Russian elections and the 
upsurge of support for the extreme nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 
provided support to the idea that NA TO enlargement might be a crucial 
safety guarantee if Russia were to return to its neo-imperialist traditions. 
Domestic factors also contributed to this dynamic as both the Republican 
and Democrat parties sought to galvanise support from the 23 million 
Americans of Central European origins. In this regard, it was noticeable 
that Presidential candidate Robert Dole placed NATO enlargement as top 
priority on his foreign policy agenda. After the June 1996 elections Dole 
intended to visit Warsaw, Prague and Budapest. The political commentator 
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William Safire noted that this is "a tour which will be seen as political; 
Polish-American voters are a force in Illinois, New Jersey and Michigan; 
Hungarian-Americans in New Jersey and Florida; Czechs in Texas and 
Illinois"," 
The Clinton administration has been undoubtedly influenced by these 
factors but the critical turning point came when Clinlon himself became 
converted to the idea of eastward enlargement as a way of ditTerentiating 
his foreign policy to that of his predecessor, The enthusiasm for the idea 
has grown markedly since then and senior administration officials have 
been at great pains to justifY the logic and rationale behind accepting new 
members, Strobe Talbot provided an article in the New York Review of 
Books in August 1995 which set out to explain why the administration 
believes enlarging NATO "encourages European integration and enhances 
European security which will benefit all the peoples of continent, and the 
larger transatlantic community as well", Richard Holbrooke addressed 
Russian concerns by the confident assertion that "enhancement of stability 
is a mutual interest of Russia and the United States, NATO, which poses 
no threat to Russian security, seeks a direct and open relationship with 
Russia"." Robert Hunter, US Ambassador to NATO, has even presented 
PFP as America's post-Cold War Marshall plan,34 
However, the seeming political consensus in Washington behind NATO 
enlargement has increasingly found voices of dissent. The first major 
detractor, outside the world of academe or think tanks, came from Senator 
Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In 
a speech on 22 June 1995, he said that 
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by forcing the pace of NATO enlargement at a volatile and unpredict-
able moment in Russia IS history. we could place ourselves in the ·worst 
of all security environments; rapidly declining defence budgets, broader 
responsibilities and heightened instability. This is the stuff self-fiilfill-
ing prophecies, and historical tragedies, are made of35 
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Other critics have followed Nunn's example, focusing in particular on the 
potential financial costs, estimated in the region of$20bn, and more 
emotively on the human costs of US soldiers potentially having to die to 
defend the Polish-Belarus border. 
Nevertheless, there remains a strong consensus behind NATO enlarge-
ment in the United States which has a wide hi-partisan base. Madeleine 
Albright's strong defence of the principle of NATO enlargement at her 
Senate confirmation delighted her predominantly Republican audience. J6 It 
seems likely that, barring major unforeseen developments, NATO enlarge-
ment will continue to secure sufficient political support in the Congress to 
overcome any potential detractors. 
France 
Just as it is vital for Germany to gain US support for NATO enlargement, 
so it is critical for Germany to obtain French agreement for the process of 
EU enlargement. As in other areas of EU policy, the Franco-German 
alliance has been the fundamental underpinning of the process of EU 
expansion and integration. However, over the issue of EU enlargement to 
the East, France's position has significantly diverged from that of Germa-
ny's. President Mittenand's initial reaction to the reunification of Germany 
and the liberation of Central Europe was one of disquiet and even dismay. 
In 1991, he upset the Central and Eastern European states by stating that it 
would take them "tens and tens of years" before they would be ready for 
membership of the EU. Further diplomatic damage was incurred when it 
emerged that Mitterrand's grand idea of a European Confederation was to 
include the Soviet Union as well as the Central European states." In addi-
tion, Mitterrand regularly repeated, against the hopes of the British, that the 
issue of eastward enlargement can in no way be permitted to obstruct the 
course of EU integration set out at Maastrich!. 
Mitterrand's distinct lack of enthusiasm for the post-1989 develop-
ments reflects a more profound French pessimism in the aftermath of the 
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Cold War. During the Cold War, France had carved out an independent 
role which had given it certain privileges disproportionate to its actual 
economic and political power. It had devised a policy promoting a maxi-
mum degree of possible independence and the development of a European 
entity that would contain West Germany, as did NATO, but would also be 
capable of resisting US supremacy. In this way, France offset West 
Germany's economic dynamism with its independent nuclear force and its 
de/acto leadership of the European Community given German inhibitions 
due to Germany's past and its division. 
From the French perspective, Germany's gains from the end of the 
Cold War have been secured at the expense of French interests. A reunified 
Germany, a Germany which has also transcended its past, is no longer a 
Germany so dependent on France or so willing to submit its decision-
making to French leadership. For a statesman like Mitterrand, with his 
Metternich-inspired geo-strategic outlook, a reunified Germany which is 
free to act to its East, to create potentially a new German Mitteielll'opa, 
represents a radical shift in the European balance of power to the detriment 
of France and to European security as a whole. Mitterrand's response was 
to promote even more urgently the process of European integration so that 
Germany could be bound more tightly into Western European institutions 
and decision-making procedures. But, particularly during the troubled 
referendum campaign over Maastricht, it became apparent that not all 
French elites were convinced of the rationale for this strategy and began 
asking whether France should not be clawing back, rather than continuing 
to cede its sovereign powers from Brussels. 
However, this initial reluctance to consider seriously the requests of 
Central and Eastern Europe for membership of the EU gradually became 
more relaxed. After much prevarication, France has re-affirmed its com-
mitment to the Franco-German alliance, working on the assumption that it 
was still better to influence Germany from within the EU than from a more 
independent stanCe. It has also judged that, since eastward enlargement is 
such a high priority for Germany, it would be better to work with Ger-
many on this issue than permit Germany to go out on its own. For its part, 
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Germany has gone to great lengths to reassure France. Germany has 
included France in the so-called Weimar Group which brings Germany, 
France and Poland together.l8 Germany has also been at pains to amrm that 
"widening" the union would not come at the expense of "deepening" the 
union, as Britain had been advocating, but rather there would be a Hegelian 
synthesis whereby "deepening" would he the pre-condition for "widening·'. 
France's stance towards Central and Eastern Europe also became more 
enthusiastic with the change to a conservative government in 1993. The 
new Prime Minister Edouard Balladur agreed to the Copenhagen Declara-
tion which offered the reform countries of the East the prospect of joining 
the Union. He also unveiled the Pact for Stability, under the auspices of the 
CFSP, as a programme for resolving the problems of minorities in Central 
and Eastern Europe in preparation for joining the EU. This became known 
as the Balladur Pact, which was signed in Paris in 1995, and has had some 
success in promoting good neighbourliness, notably with the signing of a 
Slovak-Hungarian accord. France has also played with some of the ideas of 
"variable geometry", projecting the existing European Union with an inner 
core counter-balanced by a wider partnership association with countries 
currently outside the EU. 
However, France's stance towards eastward enlargement has maintained 
certain distinctive features. First, as the Balladur Pact highlighted, France is 
keener on a political union than an economic union with the East. This reflects 
its commitment to preserving the Common Agricultural Policy and its resolve 
to ensure that the integrationist agenda and need for institutional reform should 
strictly precede any decision to take on new members. Second, France has 
consistently demanded that any movement to the East should be balanced by 
the EU addressing the needs of the South. At the Essen Summit in 1994, 
France, along with ltaly and Spain, secured equivalent financial commitments 
to North Africa as were gained by Central and Eastern Europe. And, third, 
France has refused to differentiate between the nine countries which are 
pruspective candidates and has been the strongest advocate for Romania and 
Bulgaria. This indicates a French determination to have its own sphere of 
influence in the East to counter-balance Germany's influence with its immedi-
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ate neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe. 
In general, therefore, France has a distinctly more lukewarm stance 
towards enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe than Germany. It is 
willing to accommodate German objectives but principally as a means to 
influence Germany's wider European objectives and to ensure a more 
gradualist process of enlargement. Similar policy objectives can also be 
seen in France's attitude to NATO enlargement to the East. Although it has 
not wished to obstruct German and US policies in this direction, it has 
made clear that it considers NATO must engage in further internal reforms 
before acceding to requests from the East. In particular, French policy has 
sought to strengthen the European pillar ofNA TO and to reform NATO 
structures and decision-making processes so that they remain under firmer 
political control. Thus, in both the EU and NATO, France promotes 
internal reform as a critical pre-condition before contemplating eastward 
enlargement. 
United Kingdom 
Great Britain obviously is a major power in the councils ofNA TO and the EU 
but it has not played an influential role in the eastward enlargement debate. On 
the issue ofNA TO enlargement, Britain has tended towards the more cautious 
end of the spectrum. Under the stewardship of Foreign Minister Douglas 
Hurd, the Foreign Office demonstrated a particular sensitivity to the security 
challenges facing Russia. In 1993, Britain and Russia agreed to a joint declara-
tion on peacekeeping which sought to promote greater Russian respect for the 
traditional principles of peacekeeping such as gaining tile consent of the 
parties concerned, impartiality, and the minimum use of force. As a fOfOler 
colonial power itself, Britain has perhaps had greater sympathy towards the 
post-colonial anxieties of Russia than the perceived security concerns ofthe 
fOfOler Soviet satellite states. More generally, Britain has focused more on the 
damage that eastward enlargement might have on relations with Russia, and 
with other states of the fOfOler Soviet Union, than on the security gains that it 
78 DEFENCE STUQIES 1/1997 
would confer on tl,e Central Europeans. 
Some sense of the direction of British thinking can be gleaned from the 
deliberations of the all party Commons Defence Committee in August 1995." 
Its final report concluded that the Visegrad countries should not be given the 
impression that they head the queue for membership ofNA TO. Indeed, the 
committee recommended that accession should be on a case-by-case basis 
and was in favour of giving priority to the neutral European countries, such as 
Austria, Finland and Switzerland to be encouraged to join. The Committee 
was also strongly opposed to Baltic entry into NATO given those countries' 
sensitive relations with Russia. 
The British government is likely to adopt a similarly sceptical attitude to 
NATO enlargement as the critical decisions are confronted. However, when it 
comes to the crunch, and if there is a strong US-German consensus in favour 
of enlargement, Britain is unlikely to continue its resistance. Britain does not 
want to damage what remains of its "special relationship" with the United 
States. It also wishes to preserve tlJat relationship against any further consoli-
dation of the US-Gennan relationship. Neither of these objectives would be 
attained if Britain were to continue strongly opposing NATO enlargement to 
the East against the wishes of Germany and the United States. 
In contrast to NATO enlargement, Britain is much more in favour of the 
projection ofEU enlargement. But, British influence on this matter is consider-
ably undermined by its isolation in the EU and tl,e internal divisions within 
John Major's government and the Conservative party over European policy. 
Most of Britain's EU partners perceive British support for enlargement as a 
rather transparent attempt to undermine the process of integration and to 
transform the EU into a looser free trade area. They also see a fundamental 
contradiction between British support for enlargement and its refusal to 
countenance any extension of qualified majority voting. Given these internal 
contradictions, it is highly unlikely that Germany, in particular, would consider 
London to be a useful ally in its quest for eastward enlargement. For the 
foreseeable future, it will be the Franco-German axis which will drive the 
future progress of the EU, both in its internal reforms, in its integrationist 
agenda, and in its external enlargement. 
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Other European states 
There are two other groups of European states which have some influence 
on the eastward enlargement debate. The tirst group is that of the 
Scandinavian countries which have developed a specific interest in the late 
of the three Baltic states. Denmark, in particular, has been concerned about 
this issue and has even threatened to veto NATO enlargement to the 
Visegrad countries of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic unless it 
includes some or all of the Baltic states. The other NA TO members are 
likely to resist such a move. One possible compromise might be that one or 
more of the Baltic states would be included in the first tranche of EU 
enlargement. Estonia is normally the country selected as the most appropri-
ate candidate given its relatively healthy economic situation. If this were to 
be the case, it would demonstrate an interesting way how NATO's deci-
sions might influence the process of EU enlargement. 
The second group of states includes the southern Mediterranean states 
ofthe EU and NATO, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Their 
immediate concern is that the re-orientation of European security and 
economic interests to the East might be at their expense. Although they 
have little direct influence in NA TO or the EU on this matter, they have 
sought to make their voice heard through French mediation and patronage. 
France shares a number of their interests, such as instability in North 
Africa and protection against Eastern European agricultural and industrial 
goods. But. as argued above, French policy is still predicated on the 
primacy of the Franco-German alliance. However, the support of the 
southern Mediterranean countries strengthens France's bargaining power 
in relation to Germany and can be an influential in securing compromises 
and adequate compensation from Germany in exchange for eastward 
enlargement. 
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Russia and NATO enlargement 
There is now a consensus amongst practically all sections of the Russian 
establishment that NATO enlargement would be detrimental to Russian 
security interests and must be unconditionally opposed. Although there 
have been times when Russia has appeared to soften its stance, most 
notably with Yeltsin's statement in Warsaw in 1993 which appeared to 
sanction Poland's accession to NATO and most recently with Primakov's 
seemingly emollient response to the NATO ministerial commitment to 
NATO enlargement made in December 1996, Russia has subsequently 
made clear that its opposition remains steadfast and uncompromising. The 
argument offered by the West that NATO enlargement would consolidate 
stability in Central Europe, which would be in Russia's interest as well as 
the West's, simply cuts no ice in Moscow. The consensus in Russia is that 
NATO enlargement can only have negative consequences for Russian 
security interests and thus has no redeeming features. 
The sources of this Russian opposition are rooted in a general sense of 
disillusionment with the West. In the immediate afiernlath of the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, Russia enjoyed what Moscow now calls its period of 
"romantic infatuation" with the West. The first post-Soviet government of 
Yegor Gaidar sought to promote Russia's integration with the West and to 
transform Russia into a "normal" post-colonial Western power akin to France 
or Britain. However, from about late 1992 onwards, Russia has engaged in a 
painful re-orientation of its national interests and priorities. What has subse-
quently emerged is a new hierarchy of these objectives. The first and most 
immediate challenge has been to ensure the integrity ofthe Russian Federa-
tion, which has been most directly threatened by the Chechen secessionist 
campaign. The second most important objective has been the forging of 
closer relations with the other countries of the fanner Soviet Union, the so-
called "Near Abroad", and ensuring that instability and conflict from these 
regions should not escalate and spread into Russia itself. As a result of these 
more immediate challenges, Russia has subordinated its relations with the 
West and the wider world to a third tier of interest:'" 
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Russia has not, though, considered this relative subordination of its 
relations with the West as, in itself, a reason for any weakening or cooling 
of these relations. From the Russian perspective, the deterioration of these 
relations is 110t primarily due to actions that Russia has taken. Rather, from 
the Russian perspective, a greater proportion of the blame rests with the 
West which has consistently taken an unsympathetic and excessively 
critical view of Russian foreign policy initiatives which Moscow believes it 
has been in its national imperative to adopt. In this regard, the Russian 
government has been very sensitive over Western criticisms of its Chechen 
operation, which Moscow considers a legitimate action to preserve its 
territorial sovereignty. Similarly, Russia has been dismayed at Western 
critiques of its peacekeeping operations as neo-imperialist adventures, 
when Moscow considers them as necessary interventions to preserve 
stability in the Near Abroad. In this more overarching context, the West's 
determination to extend NATO eastward appears in Moscow as the most 
blatant manifestation of Western misunderstanding of Russia's legitimate 
security concerns. 
Why Russia objects to NATO expansion 
Put simply, Russia opposes NATO enlargement because it does not want 
the world's most effective military organisation, in which Russia has no 
voice, to move closer to Russia's borders. More fundamentally, NATO 
enlargement appears in Russia to be symbolic of the West's lack of mutual 
trust. Moscow argues that, if the West genuinely does not perceive Russia 
to represent a threat, then there is no need to enlarge NATO; ipso lacto, if 
NA TO does enlarge, then the West has demonstrated that it does not trust 
Russia. 
Russia has also been at pains to convince the West that the logic of a 
unified Europe demands a pan-European security structure. Russian 
diplomats have forcefully argued that the Conference for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (from 1995 the Organisation for Security and Co-
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operation in Europe - OSCE) should be transformed into a pan-European 
security body. [n the negotiations leading to the October 1994 Budapest 
CSCE review conference, Russia argued that the CSCE should become the 
overarching co-ordinating, sometimes more controversially the "command-
ing", body overseeing the activities of the e[S, NACC, the EU, the Council 
of Europe, NATO and the WEU." Russia also argued that the decision-
making procedures of the CSCE should be reformed through the creation 
of an executive committee along the lines of UN-sty[e European Security 
Council. A[though Russian diplomats acknowledged that it would be 
difficult to gain unanimous support for these proposals within the existing 
CSCE, they were nevertheless shocked that their suggestions were so 
categorically and unconditionally rejected by the West. As this has resulted 
in the OSCE being consigned to institutional impotence and oblivion, Russia 
was not predisposed to welcome the alternative NATO-Russia partnership, 
particularly as it was designed to complement rather than preempt NATO 
enlargement. 
Russian opposition to NATO enlargement has also been strengthened by 
the belief that the Western plans for NATO enlargement have involved a 
significant element of deception. The Russian government originally, if 
re[uctantly, accepted the PFP proposals because it assumed that this 
represented the West's compromise over the NATO enlargement issue. 
The Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, argued that Russian acceptance of 
PFP was the price which had to be paid for NA TO to delay, hopefully 
indefinitely, any decision over NATO enlargement. Seen in this context, it 
is understandable why NATO's decision in December 1994 to initiate the 
En[argement Study caused such dismay. However, there remained suffi-
cient hope that the enlargement issue was still only at its preliminary 
discussion stage for Russia to agree to sign NATO's Individual Partnership 
Programme and the enhanced NATO-Russia Dialogue and Co-operation 
document in May 1995. But, these small remnants of Russian faith quickly 
evaporated when, in June, NATO started its aerial bombardment of Serb 
positions in Bosnia without consulting Moscow and when, in September, 
the NATO Enlargement Study committed NATO to accepting new mem-
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bers from the East and did not rule out the stationing of foreign troops or 
nuclear weapons on their territory. 
It has been this keen sense that the West has engaged in deliberate 
deception which has consolidated Russian opposition. In the bureaucratic 
infighting in Moscow, it is the military's stance, advocating a far more 
rejectionist position oyer NATO, which has appeared to be vindicated in 
contrast to Kozyrev's more conciliatory strategy. This is the principal 
reason why, particularly since the dismissal of Kozyrev and his replace-
ment by Yevgeny Primakov, that Moscow has taken such a firm line 
against enlargement of NATO to Poland, which at other times Russian 
officials hinted that they might be willing to stomach. The conviction is 
that, given past experience of NATO duplicity, accession of Poland and the 
other Visegrad countries would only be the stepping stone to NA TO 
considering further expansion eastward into the countries of the former 
Soviet Union. 
And, it is with this scenario that the Russian response is at its most 
vehement and uncompromising. Given its tense relations with the Baltic 
countries and the critical importance of these countries for Russia's 
security and defence framework, any hint of Baltic accession to NATO 
inevitably accentuates Russian paranoia. Also, given the geo-political 
isolation of the Baltic states, it would be difficult for NATO Article 5 
guarantees to be provided without the forward deployment of foreign, 
probably, American troops. To say the least, this would not be contem-
plated with relish in Moscow. But, the Baltic contingency pales into relative 
insignificance compared to the Russian reaction to any indication that 
Ukraine might be a potential NATO candidate. Such a scenario provokes 
only the most extreme neuralgia in Russian circles. Russia is still far from 
accepting the legitimacy of the independent Ukrainian state, maintains a 
intense national conviction that the Crimea and Sevastopol are sovereign 
Russian territory, and would thus resist forcibly any extension of the 
NA TO umbrella to cover Ukrainian territory. 
NATO can, of course, dismiss these Russian fears as unnecessarily 
alarmist. But, it cannot dismiss them entirely because NA TO has linked, if 
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in a rather ambiguous manner, the process of enlargement with the PFP 
programme, to which the Baltic states and Ukraine have shown consider-
able commitment. If PFP helps "prepare interested partners for the benefits 
and responsibilities of eventual membership", as the NATO Enlargement 
Study stresses, then Baltic and Ukrainian accession is on the cards. The 
same study also states that, once the first invitations are presented! "'it will 
be important not to foreclose the possibility of eventual alliance member-
ship for any European state" and that "no country outside the alliance 
should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process and decisions". 
For Russians to be told that they have no right of veto, when that is 
precisely what they lack, only adds to the sense of betrayal and disillusion-
ment. 
What might Russia do if NATO enlarges? 
Russian officials have not been shy to indicate what possible responses 
they could take if NATO enlargement were to take place. There has clearly 
be an interest in Russia to colour these responses in a rather lurid and 
alarmist manner so as to indicate Russian seriousness of intent. However, 
the actual response in the West has tended to be dismissive, suggesting that 
these threats are either the consequence of pre-election bargaining or the 
outpourings of disaffected imperialists within the Russian armed forces. 
The optimistic view in the West is that, with the election now decided, 
Russia will realise that it has to negotiate seriously and that it would be 
better to obtain as good a deal as possible from the West in exchange for 
acquiescence to NATO adopting new members from Central Europe. 
However, as the deadline of the Madrid Summit looms, there is still no 
clear indication that Moscow has weakened its fundamental opposition to 
NATO enlargement. Given this, it is important to survey the range of 
policy options which Moscow might contemplate if it finally decides that it 
needs to make some response to the new challenge presented by NATO. 
The following list of options indicate the wide range of any possible 
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Russian response and is by no means comprehensive. In addition, this list 
does not represent any particular hierarchy of priorities, though clearly 
some of the suggested moves are more provocative than others. 
Withdrawal/i'om PFP. One obvious potential move would be to with-
draw Russia from the PFP programme. Russia might also recommend 
friendly states, slIch as Belarus and the Central Asian states, to follow its 
decision. It should be remembered that, from the very beginning, large 
sections of the military have been opposed to PFP and the Russian Duma 
has voted overwhelmingly for withdrawal. If such a decision were made, it 
would also undoubtedly impact upon Russian participation in SFOR in the 
former Yugoslavia and result in a withdrawal both from the field of opera-
tions and from NATO Headquarters. Inevitably, this would perpetuate the 
present lack of progress on substantiating the NATO-Russia Enhanced 
Dialogue. 
Review afRussian commitment 10 OSCE. Russian attempts to 
strengthen the CSCE/OSCE have led to a Russian willingness to permit 
CSCE missions onto the territory of the former Soviet Union. After the 
start of the Chechen conflict in December 1994, Russia accepted three 
OSCE missions to Chechnya and then, in April 1995, the stationing of a 
permanent mission in Grozny. Russia also supported the creation of a 
CSCE peacekeeping force for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, though it 
was not greatly distressed when the UN partially legitimated the CIS 
peacekeeping operation. 
However, Russian willingness to countenance further activities of the 
OSCE on the territory of the fonner Soviet Union would be greatly weak-
ened by a decision to enlarge NATO. From the Russian perspective, this 
decision would symbolise the West's rejection of creating a pan-European 
security structure and its resolve to perpetuate the division of Europe 
through an enlarged NATO military bloc. Since Russia would seek to 
counter-balance this through a countervailing military bloc, the OSCE 
would have no role to play as an operational security body. 
Withdrawalji-olll CFE. The Russian reaction to NATO enlargement 
could also torpedo the 1990 CFE treaty, which limits conventional arma-
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ments. Since 1992, Russian officials have argued that the Treaty needs to 
be revised given the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. 
Russian concems have subsequently focused on the "flank limits" which 
cap the number of heavy weapons Russia can position along its northern 
and southern borders. These concerns have only been accentuated by the 
instabilities in the Caucasus and the Chechen conflict. NATO has sought to 
seek a compromise with Moscow through a partial re-drawing of the map 
of the flank zones and utilising the provisions within the Treaty for flexibil-
ity, but which nevertheless stops short of a complete renegotiation of the 
Treaty." 
However, when the November 1995 deadline for the full implementation 
of the Treaty came into effect, Russia had still not complied with the flanks 
restrictions. The Russian mood has also become more intransigent on this 
issue. It; though, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, together with 
their quotas, were to join NATO, the incongruence between the Treaty and 
the political realities could no longer be papered over. It would give the 
Russian military the perfect excuse to withdraw from the CFE Treaty and 
embark on a rearmament programme. 
Failure to ratifY START Il. The Start 1I Treaty, which was signed in 
January 1993, commits Russia and the United States to reducing their 
strategic nuclear arsenals to 3,500 weapons - significantly below the 6,000 
called for in the 1991 START 1. However, neither the US Senate nor the 
Russian Federal Assembly has ratified START 1I and NATO enlargement 
would almost certainly inhibit Russian ratification. Russian critics of the 
treaty argue that it provides a significant nuclear advantage to the United 
States, since it requires Russia to engage in a more dramatic restructuring 
of its nuclear forces. In addition, they argue that Russia is currently in no 
position to afford a sharp reduction of its nuclear forces given its inability 
to maintain a large conventional army. In the event ofNA TO enlargement, 
these arguments will inevitably have a greater salience. 
Lowering of the nuclear threshold. NATO enlargement would certainly 
result in shifts in Russian military strategy. Given that NATO represents a 
conventionally far superior military force, Russian strategy would probably 
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involve greater reliance on nuciear weapons to provide a means of deter-
rence against NATO. Russian strategy would, somewhat ironically, mirror 
NATO's strategy during the Cold War of using its nuclear deterrent as a 
counterweight to Soviet conventional superiority. Russia could also decide 
that it strategic vulnerability requires the forward deployment of these 
weapons in Kaliningrad, Bclarus and Western Russia. H should also be 
considered that Russia might judge that reliance on tactical nuclear weap-
ons alone would not be strategically viable. They might then consider the 
re-introduction of intermediate nuclear weapons into the European theatre, 
thereby undermining the INF Treaty. 
CIS Integration. With NATO enlargement, there would clearly be 
pressure for greater consolidation of the CIS, in particular its defence 
dimensions. Some moves in this direction have already been made. The 
decree on CIS strategy, signed by Yeltsin on 14 September 1995, stated 
that Russia would push harder for the transformation of the common-
wealth into a true collective security alliance and aim for a more consistent 
implementation of completed military pacts, such as the May 1992 
Tashkent collective security agreement." The burgeoning relationship 
between Russia and Belarus, with President Lukashenka of Belarus enthusi-
astically promoting integration, could fairly easily be transformed into a 
defence union where Russian forces and nuclear weapons could be de-
ployed on the western borders of Belarus. 
However, the really sensitive issue would be Ukraine. If NATO were to 
expand, it would seem probable that Moscow would be distinctly less 
tolerant of Ukraine's independent stance towards the CIS. Russia could be 
tempted to exert more pressure on Ukraine to, at the very least, reaffirm its 
neutrality and, at most, to integrate politically and militarily with the rest of 
the CIS to counter-balance NATO. Over Ukraine, Russia also has a formi-
dable array of levers for pressure, such as its oil and gas supplies, the 
Black Sea Fleet and Crimea, the close co-operation between Russian and 
Ukrainian enterprises, and the large ethnic Russian minority in eastern 
Ukraine. To date, Russia has been remarkably restrained from using these 
formidable levers at its disposal. But, in the context ofNA TO enlargement, 
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that restraint may no longer hold. It is also difficult to see how the West 
could seek to protect Ukraine from these pressures which would not in 
turn contribute to exacerbating the situation. Economic threats against 
Russia, such as the withdrawal of IMF support, would be potentially the 
most effective but might not be sutticient if Russia considered the issue 
onc of vital national importance. 
Foreign Policy Changes. It should be remembered that Russia is not 
just a European power but a country whose borders stretch from Europe 
to the Middle East and to the Far East. Along or close to all Russia's non-
European borders, there are multiple points of instability and a number of 
countries which have conflictual relations with the West. In the eventuality 
of aNA TO enlargement, Russia's sense of exclusion from the West could 
easily be translated into more assertive diplomacy towards the East. 
There are many potential foreign policy choices open to Russia which 
could complicate Western policy making. In the Far East, a consolidation 
of Russia's rapprochement with China could resurrect Kissinger's triangu-
lar diplomacy but, this time, to the United States' disadvantage. In the 
Middle East, Russia could strengthen its already strong strategic ties with 
Iran and re-introduce itself to the arms-hungry pariahs of the region, such 
as Iraq, Libya and Syria. In Central Asia, Russia could undermine 
Azerbaijan's and Kazakhstan's oil connections with the West by increased 
destabilisation of the region. This is not to say that Russia will necessarily 
promote all, or any, of these policies but they are all levers which Russia 
could exert, ifit felt it was in its national interest. 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
On the issue of eastward enlargement, the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe fall into two broad categories. First, there are the Visegrad coun-
tries of Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary which are 
generally recognised to be the first candidates for membership of NATO 
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and the EU. Their geographical proximity, their relatively advanced econo-
mies and more stable democratic systems set these countries apart from 
their eastern neighbours, though Slovakia's position has been considerably 
undermined by its more authoritarian government and its relative lack of 
success in its reform programmes. The second category consists of those 
countries which are not generally considered to be the first candidates for 
accession. These countries can be divided into three further sub-groups; 
Romania and Bulgaria which remained politically independent, ifunder 
Soviet tutelage, during the Cold War; the three Baltic states which were 
part of the Soviet Union but are not now members of the CIS; and Belarus 
and Ukraine which were both formerly part of the Soviet Union and are 
currently members of the CIS. 
This section provides a brief analysis of the economic and political 
situations in these various countries, their relative readiness and willingness 
to take on the responsibilities of membership ofNA TO and the EU, and the 
dilemmas and problems they will face if and when NA TO and the EU 
decide which countries will be the first new members. 
The Visegrad countries 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics have been the most 
insistent demande",.s for accession to NATO and the EU. They are also 
generally considered to be the most probable first candidates. The first 
critical question is whether they are ready for membership or, more 
accurately, whether they are close to tilifilling the necessary political, 
economic and military pre-conditions for membership. 
Given their recent communist past, all the Visegrad countries suffer 
from a common legacy of a poorly performing economy. an authoritarian 
system of governance and a Soviet-style military not under effective 
democratic control. However, although all these countries continue to be in 
the midst of economic and political reforms, they have made remarkable 
progress towards the consolidation of Western-oriented market economies, 
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fully functioning liberal democratic political systems and a restructured 
military. In economic terms, the Visegrad countries currently enjoy fast 
growth and have radically re-oriented their trade away from the former 
Comecon countries to the West, and the EU in particular. Even though the 
GDP per capita of these countries remain far below the average in the EU, 
once Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates are used as in the table 
below, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe do not lag far behind 
the poorer EU countries such as Greece and Portugal. As was argued in 
the previous chapter, there is little justification for denying EU membership 
on grounds of economic backwardness and lack of competitiveness. 
Comparisons of GNP per capita in US$ at market exchange rates and 
at PPP exchange rates in 1992 
Market exchange rates PPP exchange rates 
Germany 23,030 20,610 
Greece 7,290 8,010 
Portugal 7,450 10,120 
Turkey 1,980 5,170 
Czech Republic 2,450 7,160 
Slovak Republic 1,930 5,620 
Hungary 2,970 5,740 
Poland 1,910 4,880 
Source: Daniel Gros and Alfred Steinherr, Winds a/Change (London: 
Longman, 1995), p. 460. 
If a similar comparative assessment is made of the Visegrad countries' 
military capabilities, then analogous conclusions can be drawn. Again, their 
capabilities do not match those of the highly advanced armed forces of the 
Western European countries such as France and the United Kingdom. But 
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as a Rand Report suggests, if the comparison is made with second-tier 
NA TO militaries, such as Spain and Portugal, which are roughly compara-
ble with Poland and Hungary in terms of population and territory, then they 
actually come out the same or even better in terms of the quality of CFE-
limited major weapons systems." In addition, some of the equipment that 
the Central Europeans have is better-suited to the terrain in which they 
might have to operate, such as the Balkans, than comparable Western 
equipment. In fact, the Rand Report concludes that in this regard the 
Central Europeans are not all that far behind Italy, Belgium or the Nether-
lands. 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are also on the road to achiev-
ing a basic level of compatibility with existing NATO forces by 1999. 
Central European soldiers deployed to a NATO operation can also be 
expected to be at a level comparable to that of NATO soldiers. In addition, 
they have specific .Jjnguistic skills and a familiarity with Soviet-style weap-
ons and tactics which would be useful against the type of opponents 
NA TO is likely to confront in the future. Their involvement, with the 
exception of Hungary, in IFORlSFOR in the former Yugoslavia also 
indicates a willingness to contribute to NATO out-of:area operations. 
Overall, there would appear to few strictly technical military grounds for 
greatly deferring membership of NA TO for these countries. 
When assessing their political readiness to join NATO and the EU, it is 
best to examine the Visegrad countries individually. The Czech Republic is 
the Central European country which arguably has the fewest political 
problems. It has no notable external disputes with its neighbours, no 
significant ethnic minorities, and it is arguably the only country that has its 
military under democratic control. In addition, the Czech Republic is the 
most advanced in terms of economic reforms and meets more of the 
Maastricht criteria for monetary union than most EU members. There are, 
thus, few insurmoUntable obstacles facing Czech accession to the EU. The 
only question over its readiness to join NATO is the considerable reduced 
size of armed force, cut from 106,000 men at the time of the Czech-
Slovak split in 1993 to 65,000 by 1995. Some NA TO officials have asked 
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whether, with such as small force, the Czech Republic can contribute 
greatly to NATO's activities. 
The question of Poland's membership of NATO and the EU is much 
more complex than the Czech Republic's. Poland's economic record is 
good, and some economists consider that Poland might be the economic 
"miracle" oflhe East rather than the Czech Republic, but the country 
continues to suffer from high rates of inflation and certain sectors of its 
economy, notably in agriculture, banking and financial services, are far 
from ready for EU accession. In terms of NATO, Poland's military can 
potentially contribute significantly to the Alliance since its army is widely 
recognised as the most professional and well-trained in Central Europe. 
However, Poland has hitherto been unsuccessful in bringing the military 
under democratic control which had been principally caused by constant 
infighting between former President Walesa and a succession of defence 
ministers over control of the armed forces. However, the election of a new 
president, Alexander Kwasniewski, should herald an improvement in civil-
military relations and the subordination of the General Staff to the minister 
of defence rather than the president. 
Poland has been the most enthusiastic advocate of eastward enlarge-
ment, particularly of NATO. This policy has been even more forcefully 
promoted by the Democratic Left Coalition (SLD) government under 
Kwasniewski. Poland also has a powerful ally with Chancellor Kohl of 
Germany who has become personally committed to Polish entry into 
NATO and the EU. However, Poland is the only Visegrad country directly 
to border the Soviet Union in the form of the Russian Kaliningrad enclave 
and Russia has made clear its opposition to Polish accession. The coun-
try's large territory and its strategic deptll significantly complicates, and 
potentially greatly increases the financial cost of, NATO providing article 5 
security guarantees. If Russia were to respond in some of the ways 
indicated above, strengthening of Poland's eastern border would be an 
inevitable necessity. 
HlIngm:v differs from Poland and the Czech Republic in not having a 
common border with aNA TO member. Like Poland, though, questions 
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have been raised about effective democratic control of the Hungarian 
military with signs of backsliding since the return of the Socialist party, led 
by Gyula Horn, in May 1994. Whilst Hungary has no major internal ethnic 
minorities, it does have significant external minorities in Slovakia, Romania 
and Serbia which have occasionally created tensions with its neighbours. 
I Iowever, the government of Gyula Horn has give a high priority to reduc-
ing these tensions with Slovakia and Romania, with a bilateral treaty signed 
with the fonmer in March 1995 (in response to the Balladur Plan) and a 
similar treaty signed with Romania in the latter part of 1996. In its eco-
nomic policies, the government launched a tough austerity package in 
March 1995 which has contributed to a revival of the Hungarian economy. 
However, Hungary's high level of indebtedness remains a problem, as does 
the high percentage of GDP spent on welfare. 
Slovakia is currently the most problematic of the Visegrad countries in 
terms of its political and economic developments. The pace of economic 
and political reforms has slowed since Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar 
returned to power in September 1994. The mass privatisation programme 
has been cut back and the role of the state in the Slovak economy has been 
increased. Meciar has also sought to curb the independence of the media 
and engaged in an open effort to oust President Michal Kovac. The Slovak 
government has also back-pedalled on the treaty with Hungary on its large 
Hungarian minority, which has impeded implementation ofthat treaty. All 
these developments have damaged Slovakia's chances for early member-
ship in the EU and NATO. For its part, the Slovak government has made 
periodic indications that it might seek a closer economic and political 
relationship with Russia. 
One final point which should be noted is that Slovakia is not the only 
country where enthusiasm for NA TO enlargement has been in decline. In a 
survey of attitudes towards NATO in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, there was a marked discrepancy between an average of 71 % of 
the elites in these countries calling for NATO membership within 5 years 
as against only 44% of the general populations. Some of this scepticism, 
which has been growing since the publication of the NATO Enlargement 
94 DEFENCE SlUDIES 1{109' 
Study, appears to be filtering through to the political parties of the region, 
In January 1996, the main Czech opposition party, the Social Democrats, 
promised to hold a referendum before any decision to join NATO. The 
party also confirmed that, if the Czech Republic did join NATO, it would 
not pennit foreign troops or nuclear weapons to be based on its territory. 
Some NATO member states, most notably the US, expressed their dis-
pleasure with this, since the NATO Enlargement Study specifically stressed 
that no a priori pre-emption of the decision of whether or not to station 
foreign troops or deploy nuclear weapons should be permitted." 
Indeed, the evidence is growing that, as NATO enlargement rises more 
clearly on the political horizon, there is mounting public disquiet over the 
obligations which NATO membership brings. The calls for referenda Over 
any decision regarding membership have multiplied through out the region. 
Resistance to the stationing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons have 
grown, as can be seen in a September 1995 poll in Poland which found 
59% of respondents against the basing of foreign troops and 82% against 
the deployment of nuclear weapons in Poland. The table below is taken 
from a United States Information Survey (US lA) poll in early 1995; atti-
tudes can be expected to have hardened since. 
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Public opinion on possible NATO requirements 
Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
Sending troops to defend another country 
Support 
Oppose 
43 
49 
26 
68 
NA TO troops stationed in our territory 
Support 30 35 
Oppose 63 58 
55 
35 
56 
34 
Regular exercise of NATO forces in our country 
Support 33 28 45 
Oppose 59 66 45 
Slovakia 
33 
59 
26 
68 
23 
70 
Increased proportion of national budget for military, not social needs 
Support 
Oppose 
8 
85 
9 
85 
(Source: USIA Surveys, 1995) 
23 
67 
7 
75 
The non·Visegrad Eastern European countries 
The countries to the East of the Visegrad four face some of the greatest 
dilemmas over the issue of NATO enlargement. Given that they are highly 
unlikely to be the first candidates for accession, these excluded countries 
face an uncertain and potentially dangerous security environment in the 
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advent of their neighbours' being granted NATO membership. Most 
immediately, they would confront the threat of a new division of Europe, a 
division which would place them in a qualitatively more destabilising 
"security vacuum" between an enlarged NATO and a dissatisfied and 
belligerent Russia. It is a policy issue which will also be foremost in NATO 
thinking since it would hardly be beneficial to overall European security if, 
by increasing the security of its new members, this greatly increases the 
sense of insecurity of the rest of Eastern Europe. 
Unfortunately, there are no easy answers to these difficult questions 
and choices. For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe concerned -
Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine - three general 
policy orientations towards the issue of eastward enlargement can be 
determined. The first is to ignore the issue of postponement and maintain a 
strong commitment to joining NA TO and the EU, even if the prospects do 
not look good in the near to medium future. The second is the option of 
maintaining a strictly neutral position which favours neither East nor West. 
And, third, there is the option to forge closer ties with Russia and voluntar-
ily to accept a subordination to a Russian sphere of influence. All the non-
Visegrad countries of Eastern Europe have adopted one or more of these 
stances at different times and sometimes simultaneously. 
Of the two countries which were never part of the Soviet Union, 
Romania and Bulgaria, diverging policy stances can be seen. As a non-
Slavic state with a clear self-perception of belonging to the West, Romania 
has been one of the nl0st enthusiastic advocates for NATO and EU en-
largement. It was the first country to join the PFP programme and acces-
sion to the EU has been one of the few issues on which everyone in 
Romanian politics agrees. However, Romania inherited one orthe most 
distorted economies and closed societies in the former East bloc after 
suffering a particularly repressive and destructive form of communism 
under dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu. Its political system remains far from 
democratic as President Ion lIiescu has perpetuated the continued power of 
the former communist party, though his credentials as a politically astute 
operator willing to engage in economic and political reforms has enhanced 
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his reputation. Economically, Romania remains far behind the Visegrad 
countries with its 23 million population having a per capita GDP of about 
$1,200 in 1994 as against $4,000 in Hungary. In addition, Romania has 
significant ethnic minorities on its territory, though its relationship with its 
Hungarian minority has improved. Romania does have the benefit of an 
influential advocate in France, whu has adopted the Romanian cause partly 
to counter-balance German influence in the Visegrad countries. Despite 
this, though, Romania's prospects for joining NATO and the EU are poor. 
Bulgaria has continued to favour EU membership but its attitude 
towards NA TO enlargement has grown increasingly more sceptical than 
Romania's. Whilst President lhelyu lhelev has maintained a pro-NATO 
position, his Bulgarian Socialist Party Prime Minister lhan Videnov has 
been markedly cooler. In a visit to Brussels in April 1995, Videnov declared 
that joining NA TO was not a priority for his government and that eastward 
expansion should not be "at the expense ohhe security of other coun-
tries"46 There is also strong circumstantial evidence that a military alliance 
with Russia is being discussed in Sofia. Historic and ethnic ties, alongside a 
common anti-Turkish sentiment, have promoted this growing Russo-
Bulgarian rapprochement. On the EU front, Bulgaria is seen in Brussels to 
be the most laggard of the nine Reform countries. Reviews of current 
legislation show that Bulgaria conforms with EU regulations in only 40 out 
of some 200 areas identified as important for integration into the EU. 
Bulgaria has a sponsor in Greece but this is unlikely to accelerate its path 
towards EU membership. 
The Baltic States have real security concerns which would be greatly 
accentuated by a NATO enlargement which excluded them. Lithuania is the 
only Baltic state which has managed to defuse tensions surrounding its 
ethnic Russian minority, though it must consider the status of Kaliningrad 
since Lithuanian territory separates this enclave from the rest of Russia. 
Lithuania would like to see the demilitarisation ofKaliningrad but Russia 
has responded that this would only occur if Poland and Lithuania were not 
to join NATO. Estonia and Latvia, though, continue to have strained 
relations with Russia over their ethnic Russian minorities which provokes 
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strong nationalist feelings in Moscow as well as amongst ethnic Estonians 
and Latvians. As argued above, there is almost no chance that NATO will 
consider taking on any new members from the Baltic states, given their 
geo-strategic isolation and minuscule defence forces. The EU might be able 
to offer some compensation by selecting one or more of the Baltic states 
for early accession into the EU but that depends on the EU overcoming its 
present institutional and political inertia. The only other viable avenue for 
reassuring the Baltic states would be additional Western statements ex-
pressing their commitment to the protection of the political independence 
and territorial sovereignty of these countries. Greater political and eco-
nomic co-operation with the other Nordic and Baltic countries, such as 
Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, would also be beneficial. 
Belarus and Ukraine lie on the furthermost eastern part of the European 
territory bordering Russia and thus face the most immediate fall-out of any 
Russian retaliation against NATO expansion. Both countries have formally 
remained committed to a position of neutrality and non-alignment. How-
ever, Belarus has increasingly asserted an anti-NATO position which even 
surpasses that of Russia's. In April 1995, President Lukashenka con-
demned the pursuit of NATO membership of Central and Eastern European 
countries as "creating an imbalance of forces in Europe likely to lead to 
military confrontation". He added that "militarily and politically we have 
two options; either we protect our national assets with Russia or we make 
the republic a corridor for the passage of giant military formation"." 
Lukashenka has also used the excuse of NA TO expansion to discontinue 
the CFE treaty-mandated destruction of weapons. 
Lukashenka's belligerence has notably increased since the publication of 
the NA TO Enlargement Study. During early 1996, the Belarus president 
called for a political, economic and military union with Russia; warned that 
he would allow nuclear weapons to be stationed in the republic ifNA TO 
enlargement took place; and called for a "road corridor" through Belarus to 
link Russia with Kaliningrad." The Russian government has been forced to 
deny or qualify many of Lukashenka's pronouncements but it would be 
wrong to dismiss the Belarusian president as a crazed maverick. 
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Lukashenko has a surprising level of popularity even within Russia and 
Yeltsin, from time to time, has emphasised that he has by no means ruled 
out unification with Belarus. 
Finally, Ukraine faces the most daunting challenges if NATO enlarge-
ment were to take place. Like Belarus, Ukraine has adopted a neutral and 
non-aligned stance but it has been less committed to the CIS, refusing to 
sign the 1992 CIS Tashkent Collective Defence Treaty, and has had a far 
more hostile relationship with Russia. Ukraine's stance towards NATO 
enlargement has tended to vacillate, reflecting the complicated internal 
balancing act in its foreign policy between East and West. Under former 
President Kravchuk, Ukraine wholeheartedly endorsed NA TO's plans. A 
mOre cautious line was originally adopted by the incoming President Leonid 
Kuchma in 1994 who re-confirmed Ukraine's neutrality and non-alignment 
and expressed his concern that NATO enlargement must accommodate 
Russian interests. 
However, since mid-1995 the Ukrainian position has tilted towards a 
more favourable assessment of NATO's policies towards the East. Ukraine 
has participated with growing enthusiasm in PFP joint exercises and 
activities. In May 1995, when Clinton visited Kiev, the US delegation noted 
a perceptible shift in favour ofNA TO enlargement compared to the previ-
ous year. The following month, Kuchma stated that "the process of NA TO 
enlargement is underway and it is impossible to stop it" and noted that, 
although Ukraine was officially non-aligned, "it is nonsense for Ukraine to 
be non-aligned. Ukraine's geographical position contradicts this doctrine"." 
In the same month, Ukraine was also offered a special dialogue and an 
enhanced relationship with NATO, mirroring the similar deal offered to 
Russia. 
In practical terms, though, Ukrainian membership of NATO is a politi-
cal non-starter and, as was argued above, Russia has the political will and 
significant levers of pressure to influence developments in Ukraine which 
the West cannot match. NATO's offer of an enhanced relationship with 
Ukraine represents a signal of its concern but it is difficult to imagine how 
it can increase Ukrainian security without the prior success of the Russia-
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NA TO enhanced relationship. There is also the problem that, by offering 
the same deal to Ukraine, this can potentially devalue the proposed special 
relationship with Russia. 
The extent to which the United States has committed itself to Ukraine is 
also a significant expression of its commitment to Ukrainian independence. 
Ukraine is now the third largest recipient of US aid after Israel and Egypt. 
Senior US officials make regular visits to Kiev and former Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher sought to reassure Ukraine that the US considers 
the country "a linchpin of European security". In these ways, the United 
States has shown a commendable commitment (0 Ukraine but, if it came to 
the crunch, it can do little to protect Ukraine if Moscow were to react 
negatively in the event of NATO deciding to adopt new members. 
Where greater support for Ukraine could be provided is through the EU. 
The truth is that the EU's contribution to the Ukrainian economic and 
political situation has been nothing short of scandalous. Of the $5 bn 
Ukraine received in 1995, the net contribution of the EU was about $}O 
million.50 Since Ukraine has not been recognised as a reform country, it 
suffers from the full trade restrictions on "sensitive goods" which consti-
tute the vast bulk of Ukraine's exports. One third of Ukraine's exports are 
steel; one third chemicals; and one third textiles and agricultural products. 
As a result, a half of Ukraine's exports continue to flow into Russia. 
The first practical step the EU could make to promoting Ukraine's 
security - by increasing its prosperity and decreasing its dependence on 
Russia - is for the EU to contribute far more to Ukraine's economic 
recovery and to open up the EU for Ukrainian exports. The idea of a 
European Free Trade Zone, which some economists have recommended, 
would be a good step since it would strengthen the hand of reformers not 
only in Ukraine but in all the European countries of the former Soviet 
Union. Trade between East and West would be encouraged, thereby 
unravelling what is currently an economic iron curtain between the coun-
tries of the CIS and the rest of Europe, which includes both the EU and the 
Reform countries. This would also obviously enhance Ukraine's prospects 
for building upon its Western political and economic orientation. 
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However, in the final analysis Ukraine's fate rests on the larger geo-
strategic relationship between NATO, the United States and Russia. 
Ukraine's fate is in the hands of external powers and forces which is the 
reason why, especially from the Ukrainian perspective, the issue of NATO 
enlargement has to be so carefully managed. 
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Com:h.lsiol1l: The way forward 
At least from the perspective of the aspirant Central European countries, 
the process of NATO and EU enlargement has not been fast. The underly-
ing causes for the difficulties and obstacles facing enlargement, which 
were first exposed by the Yugoslav conflict, were analysed in chapter l. 
The war in Yugoslavia highlighted the institutional weaknesses in NATO 
and the EU in two critical areas. First, the war demonstrated how difficult 
it currently is for NA TO and EU member states to reach common positions 
upon which joint action can be agreed. In the post-Cold War era, national 
interests and objectives are increasingly diverging which directly weakens 
the capacity of quasi-supranational institutions, such as NATO and the EU, 
to define a collective purpose and will. Second, the war revealed the urgent 
need for internal reform of NATO and the EU if they are to meet the 
security demands ofthe post-Cold War era. In particular, the challenge for 
both these institutions has been to consolidate the principle of solidarity, 
which is the foundation for effective joint action, with the requirement of 
greater operational flexibility, which is essential for managing the more 
fluid post-Cold War political and security situation. In general, NATO has 
moved more effectively and swiftly than the EU to find a solution to this 
challenge. 
Despite these obstacles, however, substantial progress has been made 
in the promotion of eastward enlargement. Details of the various proposals 
and measures taken by NATO, the EU, and the WEU in furthering the 
process of eastward enlargement are covered in chapter 2. The momentum 
for this dynamic has been sustained by three main factors. First, there is 
the simple question of credibility. Having made repeated promises that 
enlargement will take place, the credibility of these western institutions, and 
their respective members states, would be critically damaged by a direct 
refusal to countenance further expansion. Second, although eastward 
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enlargement potentially involves significant political and economic costs, 
maintaining the old East-West division in Europe is widely considered to be 
even more unacceptable. Third, and perhaps of greatest significance, is 
that the most powerful states in the EU and NATO, Germany and the 
United States, have been the most committed towards NA TO and EU 
enlargement. As is argued in chapter 3, the post-Cold War reunified 
Germany has emerged as the most powerful and influential European state 
and its commitment to both NATO and EU eastward enlargement has been 
critical. US support for NA TO enlargement has likewise maintained the 
dynamic of expansion. 
In an ideal world, it would be best if NATO and the EU were to take on 
new members from Central and Eastern Europe at the same time and at the 
same pace. However, the reality is that NATO has emerged as the clear 
front runner in making substantive offers to aspirant members in the East. 
The causes for this were addressed in chapter 2. One factor is that mem-
bership of the EU requires the fulfilment ofa more complex and demanding 
set of conditions, the so-called acqllis cOlllllllll1itaire, than is required for 
NATO membership. However, a more important cause of the EU's relative 
slowness of response is that, in comparison to NATO, the EU has a more 
ambitious reform agenda, including the establishment of European Mon-
etary Union, which has tended to relegate the issue of eastward enlarge-
ment. In addition, the EU has been as yet unwilling to grasp the difficult, 
and politically sensitive, issues which would inevitably arise from the 
accession of up to ten new members from Central and Eastern Europe. 
NA TO is, therefore, set to make the first substantive move towards 
accepting new members from Central and Eastern Europe. It is expected 
that at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the first candidates will be identi-
fied and will be invited to participate in the negotiations for full member-
ship. This landmark summit will have to make a number of sensitive and 
difficult choices, the ramifications of which will be the focus of consider-
able political and diplomatic activity. This final section will seek to address 
the most important and controversial of these choices and decisions. These 
include: Who and when to accept first members? What are the practical 
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implications of such a decision, particularly as regards the provision of 
security guarantees and the attendant financial costs and military obliga-
tions? How can one minimise the negative reaction from Moscow and 
ensure that Russia accepts the logic of enlargement? What to do abollt the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe which are not accepted for 
membership in the first instance? What role can the EU play in developing 
its enlargement process and its relations with Central and Eastern Europe? 
Who and when to take new members? 
It is fairly clear that the front runners for the first tranche of members into 
NATO are Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Slovakia, the remain-
ing Visegrad country, has effectively ruled itself out by its turn towards 
authoritarian government, its poor economic record, and its failure to 
subordinate the military to democratic control. In Slovakia's place, 
Slovenia might be promoted in the first group of members, since its 
political and economic record is excellent and even Russia does not object 
to its membership of NATO. 
The next question is whether NATO would take these three Visegrad 
countries and Slovenfa as one bloc or whether they might be treated on a 
case-by-case basis with one or two of them being accepted for negotia-
tions before the other(s). However, whatever strategy is adopted, it is clear 
that the political impetus is for the negotiations for membership to be 
concluded by the 50th anniversary of NATO in 1999. It should also be 
remembered that the national parliaments of all 16 ofthe Allies have to 
ratifY the accession of new members, so the timetable is quite tight. 
One critical question which will arise after NA TO has identified its 
candidate members is how the EU will respond. After NA TO's decision, 
the pressure on the EU will inevitably grow to identifY its new candidate 
members and to accelerate the process of enlargement. Those countries 
which have been offered membership of NATO will certainly make more 
forceful their representation for complementary EU membership. However, 
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a number of countries who are unlikely to be asked to join NA TO, and 
who will feel bitter about their exclusion, will seek compensation from the 
EU. Scandinavian countries in the EU, like Denmark and Finland, have 
already been pressing for the EU to consider the Baltic states in its first 
trance of members so as to alleviate the Baltic sense of insecurity in the 
eventuality of aNA TO enlargement which excludes them. 
What commitments and obligations will NATO and the new 
members be required to adopt? 
The NATO Enlargement Study left this issue relatively open, requiring 
candidate states not to exclude a priori the stationing of foreign troops and 
nuclear weapons on their territory. However, the study did emphasise that 
the French and Spanish options of refusing to join NATO's military 
command structure was not open to aspirant members. Nevertheless, 
given the need to minimise the financial and political costs to NATO 
member states and to convince Russia of the logic of enlargement, it is 
probable that the commitments will not be very extensive. It seems highly 
unlikely that nuclear weapons or foreign troops wiII be stationed on the 
territory of the new members. This was confirmed at the December 1996 
NATO ministerial meeting when it was stated that NATO had no plans for 
such deployment. NATO will also undoubtedly seek to reassure Russia that 
enlargement wiII not involve the militarisation of the eastern borders of 
these states. In addition, given that NATO is in the process of drastically 
reducing its command structures, it is almost certain that no new NATO 
Commands will be designated for the territory of the new members. 
Such a relative!y low-key extension ofNA TO into the potential new 
members is not solely for Russia's benefit. It would also have the advan-
tage of reducing the financial costs, for both the existing and candidate 
members, of the process of enlargement. NATO has not itself provided 
any castings of enlargement since that would involve an assumption of 
who those new members are. However, specialists from Rand have 
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provided some estimates, ranging from $1 0-20bn for the provision by 
NATO of self-defence support to the new member states to $55-11 Obn for 
full forward presence ofNA TO." Clearly, NATO enlargement with associ-
ated costs closer to the lower end of the scale would be politically more 
attractive to NATO governments which are, in any case, under consider-
able domestic pressure to contain or reduce defence costs. 
What to do with Russia? 
Russia will inevitably loom large over the Madrid 1997 Summit. As argued 
in chapter 3, there is an almost universal Russian consensus in opposition 
to NATO expansion and Moscow has indicated a number of anti-Western 
policies it might adopt, if NATO enlargement takes place. It is clearly in the 
West's and NATO's interest to ensure that Russia does not adopt these 
policies and generally to minimise the extent of Moscow's negative reac-
tion to any NATO decision to take on new members. 
However, it is difficult to see how NA TO can fully accommodate 
Moscow's concerns. The present approach of arguing that NATO enlarge-
ment is in Russia's as well as the West's interest, since it entrenches 
stability in Central Europe, is not a fruitful avenue to explore. This argu-
ment simply cuts no ice in Moscow and will not weaken Russian opposi-
tion. 
Another more effective avenue is for Western governments to confirm 
and demonstrate the non-threatening and limited nature ofNA TO enlarge-
ment. In part, this requires the kind of reassurances that have already been 
made that nuclear weapons and foreign troops will not be moving closer to 
Russia's borders. In part, it involves NATO leaders explaining the internal 
reforms that are being implemented within NATO, which are aimed at 
transforming the alliance from a monolithic anti-Soviet military machine to 
a more flexible and open-ended structure, which can even permit the 
participation of Russian forces such as in IFORlSFOR. 
But, NATO governments also need to grapple with how to reassure 
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Russia that NA TO is not engaged in a rolling process of expansion which 
is aimed at encircling Russia. One solution would be to state that there will 
be no further accessions to NATO after the first candidates are selected. 
However, this would be a difficult position for NA TO to adopt given its 
commitment that accepting new members would not prejudice the claims 
of the other Central and Eastern European states. Nevertheleso, it could still 
be made clear that further accessions will only be considered after a 
lengthy period of time, since NATO can only gradually absorb the new 
members it has taken on. To satisfy Russia further, it would be important 
to break the perceived linkage between PFP and NA TO membership, since 
this gives the impression in Moscow that NATO intends to pursue a 
gradual process of encirclement right up to Russia's borders. 
A complementary avenue for seeking to placate Russia is through giving 
greater substance to the NATO-Russia relationship. The importance of 
NA TO developing its own individual relationship with Russia, reflecting 
Russia's weight and influence in European security atfairs, has been 
recognised ever since the Brussels 1994 summit. However, progress in 
developing this relationship has not been good. In May 1995. a framework 
for Enhanced NATO-Russia Dialogue and Co-operation was signed in 
Moscow but this was a fairly anodyne document and has not provided the 
dynamic for substantive negotiations. Progress has also been inhibited by a 
Russian reluctance to engage in such negotiations whilst its opposition to 
NA TO enlargement was ignored. However. after the December 1996 
ministerial meeting, Russia indicated that it had now accepted that enlarge-
ment was going to take place and that it was willing to engage more 
intensively in discussions over a renewed NATO-Russian relationship, even 
though its principled opposition to NATO enlargement remained steadfast. 
There have been numerous ideas for how to give greater substance to 
the NATO-Russia relations. There have variously been ideas of a non-
aggression pact, aNA TO-Russia Charter and a "commil1ee of I 7", group-
ing NATO's lull members and Russia.52 All these suggestions seek to give 
Russia a real voice in European security matters but without endangering 
the independent decision-making ofNA TO. In a recent book, Christoph 
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Bertram has provided an interesting variant of how a Russia-NATO rela-
tionship might be constructed." He argues that a committee, a declaration, 
or even a treaty is not adequate; instead, there must be established a ru11-
blown institution involving Russia on the one side and NATO on the other. 
The possible features of this institution would include:The Secretary-
General of NATO and a Russian counterpart to act as chief co-ordinating 
officers, responsible to a Council of Ministers, consisting of the Russian 
Foreign and Defence Ministers and their Western counterparts chosen by 
rotation within NATO, and to a Committee of Permanent Representatives. 
A Military Committee of representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry 
and the NA TO Military Committee to act as the permanent group for 
exchanging information on military planning and military operations, as well 
as preparingjoinl operations, including peacekeeping. A Nuclear Planning 
Group to address issues of de-nuclearisation and nuclear proliferation. An 
Arms Conlrol Working Group to look at ways to implement the arms 
control agenda, including the issue of arms exports. A Parliamentary 
Contact Group to bring together, on a regular basis, a delegation of the 
North Atlantic Assembly, and the Russian Duma. 
Bertram's radical suggestions indicate, however, the difficulties and 
pitfalls of establishing a more permanent institutionalised structure for a 
NA TO-Russia relationship. If a forum something along the lines suggested 
by Bertram were to be established, the West might gain greater influence 
over Russian actions and policies but the quid pro quo is that Russia would 
also be able to influence NATO's policies and decisions. The latter eventu-
ality would lead many, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, to 
perceive the proposed forum as a NATO-Russia condominium. But, on the 
other hand, Russia would not be fully satisfied by such a forum because it 
does not provide the amount of "voice" it seeks. Perceiving itself as a 
Great Power in Europe, Russia will not be satisfied with purely consultative 
arrangements, however institutionalised they might be, but wanls a "voice" 
which has real powers to initiate and veto proposals. This is an arrange-
ment the West will not accept. 
Nevertheless, the experience of the Contact Group for the former 
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Yugoslavia indicates the extent to which Russian inclusion as a participating 
Great Power flatters Russian pride and overcomes its anxieties to be 
treated as an equal in European security matters. There is much mileage to 
be gained from providing the formal appearance of such inclusion and 
equality, even if the reality is a more elevated form of consultation. 
What to do with the other excluded Central and Easiern 
European states? 
The Baltic States and Ukraine, which face genuine security threats given 
their problematic relations with Russia, would undoubtedly be adversely 
affected by any NATO decision to enlarge. It is difficult to see what could 
be done to resolve their security dilemma which is not itself dependent on 
the success of a NATO-Russia rapprochement. Further Western state-
ments of their commitment to the political independence and territorial 
sovereignty of these countries would help. Also, convincing these coun-
tries that PFP provides real security guarantees, if not to the extent of 
article 5, could go someway to alleviate their fears. There are also certain 
measures which could be taken to enhance PFP, which would make 
Partners more directly involved in NATO decision making such as pennit-
ting them to participate directly in NATO Commands rather than through 
the Partnership Coordination Cell. However, realistically, none of these 
moves can fully compensate for the failure to attain the security prize of 
article 5. 
What role can the EU play? 
However, there is a potentially vital role that the EU could play to amelio-
rate the sense of exclusion and insecurity in the Baltic states and Ukraine. 
One option is that, in the aftermath of the Baltic states' failure to join 
NATO, one or more of these states could be included in the first tranche of 
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EU members. Estonia is the country sometimes identified as a potential 
initial candidate, given its relatively healthy economic condition. In the case 
of Ukraine, the EU could go much further in opening its markets to Ukrain-
ian goods and in providing financial assistance. The EU's present record in 
this regard is deplorable, with most Ukrainian exports deemed to be "sensi-
tive" and facing formidable trade barriers. As a result, half of Ukraine's 
exports continue to flow to Russia. The EU's failure to commit itself to 
Ukraine can also be seen in the fact that, of $Sbn provided in financial 
assistance to Ukraine in 1995, the net contribution of the EU was $30m." 
In reality, there exists an economic iron curtain separating the CIS coun-
tries from the rest of Europe which the EU should seek to dismantle. In so 
doing, this would be the most concrete step that could be taken to support 
Ukraine's determination to balance its relations between Russia and the 
West. 
However, particularly in the case of Ukraine, Russia has the political 
will, and multiple levers at its disposal, to exert pressure on Kiev to align its 
policies with Moscow. if Russia were to respond negatively to NATO 
enlargement, it seems unlikely that Moscow will tolerate Ukraine's continu-
ing independent stance towards the eIS. If only for the future fate of 
Ukraine, this should engender caution in the West as to how it manages the 
process of NATO enlargement. 
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